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INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court validated the limited use of
race as an admissions criterion in Grutter v. Bollinger eight years ago,1
many veterans of the civil rights struggle greeted the decision with elation.
Elaine R. Jones, then-President of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., called the decision upholding the University of Michigan’s law school admissions program “a slam-dunk victory affirming the
principles we have been fighting for.”2 Professor Jack Greenberg, one of
*

Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law. I received particularly helpful feedback
on earlier drafts from the following people: Katharine Bartlett, Oren Bracha, Dorothy Brown, Sherry
Colb, Rosalind Dixon, Karen Engle, Laura Ferry, William Forbath, Jacob Gersen, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Christopher Hsu, Amy Kapczynski, Randall Kennedy, Sanford Levinson, Wendy Parker, Scot
Powe, David Rabban, Lawrence Sager, Gregory Shaffer, Suzanna Sherry, Jordan Steiker, and Patrick
Woolley. In addition, I received many thoughtful questions from participants in the faculty workshops
at the following law schools: Boston College, Chicago, Colorado, Duke, Emory, Fordham, Georgia,
Georgetown, Minnesota, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington University in St. Louis.
Charles Mackel and Mark Wiles provided stellar research assistance.
1
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2
Lynette Clemetson, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Chief Retires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at A10.
In announcing her departure from an organization for which she had worked for thirty-two years, Jones
cited the positive result in Grutter as enabling her to retire with a clear conscience: “After that I knew I
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Jones’s predecessors at the Legal Defense Fund and part of the litigation
team who won Brown v. Board of Education,3 also viewed Grutter as an affirmation of the organization’s efforts to achieve black advancement.4 Professor Greenberg expressed particular admiration for Grutter’s conception
of affirmative action not as a policy that benefits primarily blacks but instead as a policy that benefits all of American society—including the armed
services and the business communities.5 Referring to Justice O’Connor’s
opinion for the Court in Grutter, Professor Greenberg commented that she
kept “[h]er eye . . . on the condition of society and what affirmative action
can do to help fix it, not what caused the condition.”6 This holistic perspective was, in Professor Greenberg’s estimation, deeply commendable.7 “In
this I think she is not only right,” Professor Greenberg wrote, “but it is what
has been the driving force of affirmative action all the time: affirmative action to make ours a better country.”8
Grutter was not, of course, praised in all circles. In addition to criticism launched at the opinion from the right for its refusal to prohibit racial
classifications,9 legal scholars on the left also criticized Grutter for precisely the feature that Professor Greenberg lauded: its justification of affirmative action as a compelling government interest on the ground that such
programs enhance leading American institutions rather than on the ground
that such programs benefit racial minorities.
Most prominently, Professor Derrick Bell viewed Grutter as a “definitive example” of his “interest-convergence” thesis.10 According to this thecould go.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). Professor Lani Guinier invoked precisely the same
basketball metaphor as Jones did to describe the complete nature of the Grutter victory. See Lani Guinier, The Constitution Is Both Colorblind and Color-Conscious, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 2003, at
B11 (“The Supreme Court’s decision was a slam-dunk victory for affirmative action.”).
3
347 U.S. 483, 484 (1954).
4
See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610
(2003). For an argument viewing Grutter as a reaffirmation of Brown, see Harry T. Edwards, The Journey from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity,
102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 946 (2004): “Through the ideal of diversity, Grutter reaffirmed Brown’s commitment to racial equality.”
5
Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1618–19 (noting that Grutter conceptualized “affirmative action for
what it does for society as a whole”). As is well known, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in
Grutter validated the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action policy, in part, by citing
amicus briefs from retired military officers and Fortune 500 companies. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31.
6
Greenberg, supra note 4, at 1621.
7
See id.
8
Id. For a similar analysis that preceded Grutter, see Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher
Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 522–25 (2002).
9
See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and Gratz: Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation
Held “Patently Unconstitutional” Unless Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity,”
78 TUL. L. REV. 2037, 2048 (2004).
10
Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003) [hereinafter Bell,
Diversity’s Distractions]; see also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 149 (2004) [hereinafter BELL, SILENT
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sis, blacks receive favorable judicial decisions to the extent that their interests coincide with the interests of whites.11 The Court’s decision in Brown,
by these lights, was not motivated by a desire to redress black suffering under racial segregation; instead, the United States eliminated Jim Crow in
order to improve its international image during the Cold War.12 Writing
nearly five decades after Brown was decided, Professor Bell detected similar motivations animating the Court’s decision in Grutter: “When [Justice
O’Connor] perceived in the Michigan Law School’s admissions program an
affirmative action plan that minimizes the importance of race while offering
maximum protection to whites and those aspects of society with which she
identifies, she supported it.”13 Professor Bell contended that Grutter
“should provide [him] with some measure of a prophet’s pride” because he
has long asserted “that no matter how much harm blacks were suffering because of racial hostility and discrimination, we could not obtain meaningful
relief until policymakers perceived that the relief blacks sought furthered
interests or resolved issues of more primary concern.”14 Just as Brown did
not immediately lead to desegregated schools in much of the country,15 Professor Bell predicted that Grutter would prove to be a fleeting victory for
COVENANTS] (referring to Grutter as a “prime example” of the interest-convergence thesis). Professor
Bell referred to “interest convergence” as a “dilemma” in his 1980 Harvard Law Review article. Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV.
518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma]. Throughout this Article, however, I generally use the terms “thesis” and “theory” interchangeably. I do so for two different reasons. First, Professor Bell uses these terms in his subsequent scholarship. Second, the terms are—to my ears, at least—
less loaded than the term “dilemma.”
11
Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10.
12
See id. After Professor Bell observed the Cold War implications of Brown, Professor Mary Dudziak discovered extensive documentation that was designed to underscore how anti-Communist concerns played an important role in motivating the U.S. government to advocate racial desegregation. See
Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 66 (1988) (“I conclude by suggesting that this article demonstrates Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis: The consensus against racial segregation in the 1950s resulted from a convergence of interests on the part of
whites and persons of color.”). There is no question that anti-Communist sentiment exerted some influence in motivating the Solicitor General’s office, among other offices within the U.S. government, to
oppose racial segregation. See id. at 62–63. As Professor Curtis Bradley has noted, however, it is also
possible that the role of anti-Communism in motivating the government to end desegregation has been
overstated. See Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Affairs and Domestic Reform, 87 VA. L. REV. 1475, 1476
(2001) (“[T]o say that Cold War foreign affairs played a role in U.S. civil rights reform does not tell us
much about its relative influence as compared with other influences, a difficult if not impossible empirical question. Even in light of the substantial evidence that Professor Dudziak presents suggesting that
U.S. government officials linked race relations to Cold War politics, one still might conclude that the
influence of the Cold War concerns on civil rights reform was relatively minor when compared with
other, domestic influences.”).
13
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 151 (“Diversity in the classroom, the work floor,
and the military, not the need to address past and continuing racial barriers, gained her vote.”).
14
Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 10, at 1624.
15
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–63 (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 (2d ed. 2008).
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racial minorities: “Once again, blacks and Hispanics are the fortuitous beneficiaries of a ruling that can and probably will change when other priorities
assert themselves.”16
Professor Bell was far from alone in viewing Grutter as evidence of
the interest-convergence theory at work. Indeed, a strikingly large number
of scholars independently identified the Court’s decision as a vivid illustration of racial interests converging.17 Grutter thus provides a clear view of
the central position that the interest-convergence theory occupies in constitutional law scholarship in general and race relations law in particular.
Even though Professor Bell introduced the theory more than thirty years
ago, many scholars who explore how race interacts with the law continue to
regard it as “enormously influential.”18 Aided by the historical scholarship
16

BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 151.
See Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past, Present, and Future,
47 HOW. L.J. 795, 827 (2004) (“[W]e have come full circle to the ‘interest-convergence’ idea articulated
by Derrick Bell a generation ago.”); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The
Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1484 (2005) (“The predominant line of reasoning
running through the Michigan opinion remained that affirmative action furthers the interests of whites as
a group, even if such programs sometimes deny individual whites access to certain selective institutions
of higher education. In other words, the interests of the majority converged with the interests of the minority, and it is this convergence that justified programs that otherwise would be deemed unlawful.”);
Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2004) (“Perhaps [Grutter] is just another example of what Derrick Bell has called ‘interest-convergence’—that civil rights progress occurs only in
moments when it benefits white elites, whether for economic profit or national security. Just as Brown
v. Board of Education’s historic prohibition of segregation came in a context of the United States military promoting diversity on behalf of national security, here again in the wake of terrorist attacks—a
new national crisis—the Court appears to be paying attention to the views of retired military leaders and
powerful business forces that claim affirmative action protects their interests.” (footnote omitted)); Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America’s
Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1612–13 (2004) (“This alignment
of interests was achieved in the Grutter opinion fifty years [after Brown], where it succeeded in securing
qualified support for affirmative action from a fundamentally conservative Court.”); Daria Roithmayr,
Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 213 (2004) (“Derrick Bell
writes that material gains come to communities of color only when those gains serve white interests.
Grutter demonstrates Bell’s point.” (footnote omitted)).
18
Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 271 n.67 (2005). See also Richard Delgado, Two Ways to
Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection,
89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2284 (2001) [hereinafter Delgado, Two Ways] (describing Interest-Convergence Dilemma as a “classic article”); Dudziak, supra note 12, at 64 (deeming Interest-Convergence Dilemma
“important and suggestive”); Neil Gotanda, Towards Repeal of Asian Exclusion, in ASIAN AMERICANS
AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 309, 313 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1996) (labeling the theory
an “influential suggestion”); Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board
of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 94 (2004) (describing InterestConvergence Dilemma as an “influential article”); David A. Singleton, Interest Convergence and the
Education of African-American Boys in Cincinnati: Motivating Suburban Whites to Embrace Interdistrict Education Reform, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 663, 671 (2007) (deeming the work an “influential article”);
Alexander Tsesis, Justice at War and Brown v. Board of Education, 47 HOW. L.J. 361, 367 (2004)
(labeling the work an “influential article”); Book Note, Brown’s Potential, Still Unrealized, 115 HARV.
17
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that has supported Professor Bell’s assertion regarding the primacy of the
Cold War in achieving desegregation,19 the interest-convergence thesis has
become a part of the standard account of the Court’s motivations for
Brown.20 Scholars particularly concerned with the plight of blacks, furthermore, continue to find vitality in the interest-convergence thesis.21 In
addition, scholars have applied the interest-convergence theory to explain
legal developments among nonblack racial groups, including Latinos22 and
Asian-Americans.23
L. REV. 2034, 2036 n.22 (2002) (reviewing WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (contending that the theory offers “compelling analyses of the Court’s motivations for outlawing segregation”)).
The Interest-Convergence Dilemma played a significant role in establishing Professor Bell as the
most prominent black law professor of his era. See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to
Dismantle that Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 284 (2000) (listing the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma first among the “treasure trove of ideas [that] Derrick Bell has showered on an entire generation of his readers!”). For testaments to Professor Bell’s prominence, see Richard Delgado, Enormous
Anomaly?: Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1550 (1991)
(reviewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987)
[hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]) (“Derrick Bell is perhaps the country’s leading AfricanAmerican legal scholar.”); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745, 1786 (1989) (“Derrick Bell is the most widely-known black legal academic in the country . . . .”). Not every commentator was convinced that Professor Bell’s scholarship warranted its preeminence. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Book Review, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 436, 437 (1988) (reviewing
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED) (“[T]here can be no sin for which reading Professor Derrick Bell is
not, for me, adequate punishment.”).
19
See Dudziak, supra note 12, at 66.
20
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education in International Context, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493, 493 (2005) (“Although the Brown decision did not refer to the international
stage, there is little doubt that the climate of the era explains, in significant part, why apartheid in America began to unravel after World War II.”); Justice Richard J. Goldstone & Brian Ray, The International
Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 105, 108 (2004) (“Derrick Bell’s ‘interest convergence’ theory highlights the domestic significance of the prevailing international situation
for the Brown decision.” (footnote omitted)).
21
See Cashin, supra note 18, at 254 (contending that the interest-convergence thesis offers “a key
insight into human nature and American race relations”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the
Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (2005); john a. powell, The Race
and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW & INEQ. 355, 412–13 (2007); Christine H.
Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues During the
Four Decade Evolution of the Plans, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613 (1995). For applications of the interest-convergence theory to the quest for reparations for the enslavement of blacks in the United States,
see Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts?: Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531
(2001), and Van B. Luong, Note, Political Interest Convergence: African American Reparations and the
Image of American Democracy, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 253, 263 (2002).
22
See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay, Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 63 (2006) (applying interest-convergence to explain the
Court’s decision prohibiting the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from juries and contending that interest-convergence is a helpful method for understanding “all of Latino history”); María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2005) (“Plyler v. Doe may join Brown v. Board of Education as a decision
embodying the interest convergence covenants in which educational opportunities for minority students
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The influence of the interest-convergence theory has extended well
beyond the borders of race relations law24 as legal academics have imported
the interest-convergence thesis into a wide array of doctrinal areas. Constitutional law scholarship, apart from the theory’s implications for Brown,
has imported the interest-convergence thesis to explain judicial interpretation of the First Amendment’s religion clauses and the subordination of
non-Christian religions.25 Criminal law scholarship has imported the interest-convergence thesis to explain why courts sometimes permit “cultural
defenses” to prevail.26 Employment discrimination law scholarship has imported the interest-convergence thesis to explain when employees will receive legal relief in challenging employment policies.27 Indian law
exist only when the students’ interests and the nation’s interests converge. Analyzing Plyler under an
interest convergence model demonstrates that the nation’s interest is the maintenance of an underclass of
undocumented, low-wage earners who fuel the nation’s economy by performing work that is undesirable
to many United States natives.” (footnotes omitted)).
23
See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee, The Master’s Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to AfricanAmerican Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863,
908–09 (1993) (contending that the interest-convergence thesis explains why Congress’s favorable response to the quest for reparations on behalf of Japanese-Americans for internment coincided with the
Reagan Administration’s pro-Japan trade policies).
24
Admittedly, the precise boundaries of “race relations law” are decidedly unclear—perhaps even
less clear than the boundaries separating other doctrinal areas.
25
Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion
Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 871–72 (1996) (“Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis helps explain why the separation of church and state often provides only minimal benefits to outgroup religions,
such as Judaism: To a great extent, outgroup religions benefit only when their interests happen to converge or correspond with the interests of Christians. The benefits to outgroups, in other words, are
merely incidental, while the primary benefits of separation of church and state flow, in fact, to Christianity, the hegemonically dominant religion in America.”).
26
See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 939 (2007) (“Cultural convergence is the idea that a ‘cultural defense’ is
more likely to succeed when the cultural norms underlying an immigrant or minority defendant’s cultural defense claim converge with the cultural norms of American society. Like interest convergence
theory, cultural convergence theory can be used to explain the underlying forces behind a particular decision or series of decisions. . . . Cultural convergence, however, focuses on the presence or absence of
overlapping cultural norms as opposed to converging interests.” (footnotes omitted)).
27
See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1764 (2003) (book review) (“With respect to workplace discrimination, the interest
convergence story holds that the state will require employers to hire nonwhites only when doing so converges with the institutional interests of the employer. This occurs when diversity hiring provides the
employer with institutional legitimacy without compromising the efficiency gains attendant to homogeneous workplace cultures.”); see also Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title
VII After Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 940 (2005) (exploring how alternative dispute resolution “can be used as a mechanism to focus on racial justice in the
workplace while also acting as a tool to accomplish employer incentives as interest-convergence”); Ramirez, supra note 17 (“[C]onvergence theory holds the promise of real and durable reform in the specific context of board selection processes and, by extension, in a host of other areas that may be key to raracial progress.”); Joseph C. Feldman, Note, Standing and Delivering on Title VII’s Promises: White
Employees’ Ability to Sue Employers for Discrimination Against Nonwhites, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 569, 600 (1999) (“For many whites, before they endorse policies that benefit nonwhites and
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scholarship has imported the interest-convergence thesis to explain why
state courts give effect to tribal courts’ criminal convictions but not to tribal
courts’ civil judgments.28
Alongside these examples of the theory’s application to assorted doctrinal areas, many scholars have looked to it as providing a strategic method
for producing social and political change. Among the extremely broad
range of issues that scholars believe the interest-convergence theory can
remedy or illuminate are the following: educational reform,29 pension
reform,30 animal rights,31 domestic violence,32 concentrated poverty,33 and
even the war on terror.34 The interest-convergence theory’s strategic implications have also been adopted by the popular press,35 and the theory has
been cited approvingly in federal judicial decisions.36
make the possibility of Title VII suits a real deterrent to employers who would discriminate, they must
believe that their own self-interests are furthered.”).
28
See Kevin K. Washburn, A Different Kind of Symmetry, 34 N.M. L. REV. 263, 286–87 (2004)
(contending that while “certain states are willing to credit tribal court convictions because it serves the
public safety interests of the non-Indian majority . . . the recognition of tribal civil judgments serves no
such interest and, thus, under Professor Bell’s theory, the non-Indian majority is less willing to respect
such judgments” (footnote omitted)). For additional examples of the interest-convergence theory’s application to other doctrinal fields, see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 283–84
(1996) (applying the insights of interest convergence to immigration law). These examples of interestconvergence importation present merely an illustrative rather than an exhaustive list.
29
See, e.g., Bryan L. Adamson, The H’aint in the (School) House: The Interest Convergence Paradigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 173 (2006); Singleton, supra note 18.
30
See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions, Risk, and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1505
(2004) (“[B]ecause employer sponsored pension plans exclude a majority of Whites and people of color,
according to Professor Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence thesis, this may be a unique opportunity to
effectuate pension reform.” (footnote omitted)).
31
See, e.g., Joseph Lubinski, Note, Screw the Whales, Save Me!: The Endangered Species Act, Animal Protection, and Civil Rights, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 377, 411–12 (2003).
32
See, e.g., Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White
Victim to Multi-cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1114–18 (2006).
33
See, e.g., Justin Stec, The Deconcentration of Poverty as an Example of Derrick Bell’s InterestConvergence Dilemma: White Neutrality Interests, Prisons, and Changing Inner Cities, 2 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 30 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njlsp/v2/n1/2.
34
See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial—Again: African American
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1329 (2003) (“[I]n the
short run, the United States will lack unfettered moral authority and international standing to sustain a
preemptive worldwide war on terror unless it fully and fairly redresses the continuing harms of its own
historic government-sponsored terrorizing of a significant segment of its populace.”); Stephanie M.
Weinstein, Note, A Needed Image Makeover: Interest Convergence and the United States’ War on Terror, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 403, 428 (2006).
35
See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Marriage Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, § MM, at 26. Professor
Kenji Yoshino asserted that advocates of same-sex marriage should incorporate the strategic insights of
Professor Bell’s interest-convergence thesis into the campaign to achieve marital equality. Contemplating recent and upcoming popular votes regarding the permissibility of same-sex marriage, Professor Yoshino suggested that if unmarried heterosexual couples thought that prohibiting same-sex marriage
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Given the theory’s prominence within the legal academy and beyond, it
is surprising that virtually no sustained scholarly attention has been dedicated to examining the interest-convergence thesis, the assumptions that undergird the thesis, and the consequences that flow from accepting the thesis.
Although the interest-convergence thesis is cited with great regularity, the
articles that refer to the idea almost invariably invoke the idea as a kind of
received wisdom. The few scholarly works that criticize the thesis, moreover, tend to do so in a fleeting manner.37 This Article initiates a critical
discussion of the interest-convergence thesis—a discussion that is long
overdue.
This Article proceeds in three principal parts. In order to contextualize
my critique, Part I provides a brief overview of the interest-convergence
theory. Rather than merely summarizing the article that coined the term,
however, this overview identifies the theory’s precursors within Professor
Bell’s work. The overview then closely examines the article that unveiled
the “interest-convergence” terminology and explores how that notion has
subsequently been offered to explain contemporary racial developments.
This Part and the ensuing critique draw upon many of Professor Bell’s writings throughout his career in order to gain a full appreciation of the interestconvergence theory. This eclectic approach is not only appropriate but necessary because Professor Bell has repeatedly returned to the theory, both
explicitly and implicitly, in his scholarly efforts to address contemporary
racial dynamics. In the parlance of Isaiah Berlin, Professor Bell more
closely resembles a hedgehog than a fox,38 and confining this examination
of the interest-convergence theory to only its earliest manifestations would
artificially constrain the inquiry.
With a foundational understanding of the interest-convergence theory
in place, Part II identifies and examines four analytical flaws that diminish
the theory’s persuasiveness. First, the theory’s overly broad conceptualization of “black interests” and “white interests” obscures the intensely contested disputes regarding what those terms actually mean. Second, the ininterest-convergence theory incorrectly suggests that the racial status of
would imperil their own lives (e.g., through lost health care coverage), measures designed to limit marriage would more likely be defeated at the ballot box. Professor Yoshino wrote: “If more straights could
come to see marriage as a universal right that belongs to all human beings, that would, indeed, be a convergence of interest.” Id.
36
See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Monroe, 513 F. Supp. 375, 380 n.11 (W.D. La. 1980).
37
See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 291–92 (2002); Cashin, supra note 18, at 276–77;
Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503,
525–26 (1997); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1510–11; Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court
Really Needs to Know It Learned from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 483 (1997).
38
See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF HISTORY
13 (Phoenix 2009) (1953) (dividing influential writers into two broad categories: hedgehogs, whose
work is dedicated to advancing one large proposition, and foxes, whose work resists distillation to a single notion or theme).
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blacks and whites over the course of United States history is notable more
for continuity than for change. Third, the interest-convergence theory accords insufficient agency to two groups of actors—black citizens and white
judges—who have played, and continue to play, significant roles in shaping
racial realities. Fourth, the interest-convergence theory cannot be refutedand, thus, cannot be examined for its validitybecause it accommodates racially egalitarian judicial decisions either by contending that they
are necessary concessions in order to maintain white racism or by ignoring
them altogether.
The interest-convergence theory’s analytical flaws, in turn, lead to
harmful consequences, which are explored in Part III. The insistence that
fortuitous moments of converging racial interests account for favorable
judicial and policy decisions may regrettably lead the theory’s adherents to
limit their strategies for achieving genuine racial equality. In addition, the
theory’s irrefutability strengthens the racially conspiratorial viewpoint that
is disturbingly prevalent within the black community.
At the outset, it merits emphasizing that I believe the interestconvergence theory warrants examination not only because it is influential,
but also because it contains at least some persuasive force. To be sure,
much of the following analysis levels serious criticism and expresses deep
misgivings about the theory’s analytical underpinnings and the consequences that flow from the theory. But the interest-convergence thesis cannot simply be deemed beyond analysis. While the theory is too often
categorical where it should be nuanced and too often focused on continuity
where it should acknowledge change, the theory nevertheless serves as a
valuable corrective to the narrative of unambiguous triumph that plagues a
disconcertingly large portion of scholarship regarding racial considerations
in constitutional law. The interest-convergence thesis, moreover, demonstrated an admirably early understanding among legal scholars of the way in
which domestic events cannot be viewed in utter isolation from the surrounding international context.39 Whatever the theory’s shortcomings, it is
crucial not to overlook its considerable contributions to legal discourse.
I. EXAMINING THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS
Before critiquing the interest-convergence theory, it is necessary to understand the conditions that, according to the theory, lend themselves to
achieving racial reform. This Part endeavors to provide that overview by
identifying the earliest articulation of that theory, examining the article that
coined the “interest-convergence” label, and explaining the theory’s continued application to the modern racial context.

39

Cf. Dudziak, supra note 12, at 66–67 (discussing the role international relations played in setting
civil rights agendas).
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A. Before the Interest-Convergence Thesis
Although many scholars believe that Professor Bell initially explored
the notion that black advancement occurs only where black interests coincide with the interests of white elites in his 1980 Harvard Law Review article,40 that belief is only partially accurate. In fact, while Professor Bell did
not dub the phenomenon “interest convergence” until 1980, he first articulated the underlying theory some four years earlier.41 In Racial Remediation, Professor Bell contended that white self-interest predominantly
accounts for any relief from racial oppression that blacks have experienced
throughout American history: “Measurable improvement in the status of
some blacks[] and predictions of further progress have not substantially altered the maxim: white self-interest will prevail over black rights. This unstated, but firmly followed principle has characterized racial policy
decisions in this society for three centuries.”42 There is no question, Professor Bell maintained, that moral concerns regarding the subordinate status of
blacks have not alone motivated white people to address racial inequality:
“[E]ven a rather cursory look at American legal history suggests that in the
past, the most significant political advances for blacks resulted from policies which were intended and had the effect of serving the interests and
convenience of whites rather than remedying racial injustices against
blacks . . . .”43
Racial Remediation offered a thumbnail sketch of black history in
America, highlighting instances that would, on the surface, appear to have
been designed to benefit blacks, but upon closer examination could be understood as motivated by a desire to advance white interests. Expressing
skepticism that slavery was abolished in the North because of a sudden
arousal of conscience following the Revolutionary War, Professor Bell contended that “the major motivation for abolition of slavery in the North was
the economic advantages emancipation promised white businessmen who
could not efficiently use slaves, and laborers who did not wish to compete
with slaves for jobs.”44 Professor Bell then proceeded to offer similar revisionist accounts of the Emancipation Proclamation45 and the Reconstruction
Amendments.46
40

See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 18, at 271 n.67 (“Bell first articulated his enormously influential interest-convergence theory in a Harvard Law Review article published in 1980.” (italics added)).
41
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Conditions,
52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1976) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Remediation].
42
Id. at 6.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 7. Professor Bell also postulates that abolition had the benefit for whites of, inter alia, eliminating ubiquitous fears of slave revolt. See id.
45
See id. at 7–8 (“President Lincoln was no friend of slavery, but his primary objective was to save
the Union.”).
46
See id. at 9–11.
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Turning his attention to Brown v. Board of Education,47 Professor Bell
enumerated two broad conclusions:
(1) the Supreme Court’s decisions in the school desegregation cases are the
most important legal milestone ever achieved by advocates of racial equality;
and (2) it is highly unlikely that the white self-interest factors which so clearly
motivated earlier, less significant civil rights breakthroughs were absent when
the Brown decisions were formulated.48

Although Professor Bell would eventually withdraw the rosy assessment of
Brown’s significance embodied in the first conclusion,49 his tentatively expressed second conclusion would ossify into certainty in the years to
come.50 In explaining Brown’s white self-interest component, Professor
Bell observed that the Court decided the case in the context of the Cold
War.51 Declaring racial segregation unconstitutional in public schools had
the effect of denying Communists a powerful rhetorical weapon as they
could no longer claim that the United States formally subjugated black citizens, according to Professor Bell.52 The Court’s remedial decision in
Brown II,53 which failed to require prompt desegregation of the nation’s
public schools, demonstrated both the nation’s desire to cultivate the appearance of racial equality and its lack of commitment to the genuine article.54 This pattern of advance followed quickly by retrenchment is typical
of racial progress, Professor Bell posited, because white interests seldom
overlap with black interests for extended periods of time.55

47

Professor Bell expressed some initial hesitation, which he later overcame, about assessing a legal
development that had occurred so recently. See id. at 11 (“[I]t would be presumptuous to attempt almost
contemporaneous conclusions about the Brown years.”). This caveat indicates how dramatically the
scholarly world has changed since the mid-1970s. To think that a Supreme Court case may not yet be
ripe for scholarly analysis some twenty-two years after it was decided is a jarring conception to the current era.
48
See id. at 11–12.
49
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2005) [hereinafter Bell, Unintended Lessons] (claiming that people who believe that Brown was a valuable judicial victory subscribe to a hopelessly outmoded worldview).
50
See id. at 1056 (characterizing Brown as “the definitive example that the interest of blacks in
achieving racial justice is accommodated only when and for so long as policymakers find that the interest of blacks converges with the political and economic interests of whites”).
51
Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 12.
52
Id. Bell also noted that “[t]he foreign policy advantages of a pro-civil rights result in Brown were
specifically argued to the Court in the federal government’s amicus curiae briefs.” Id.
53
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
54
See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 13 (“Spurred by the need to confront a political or
economic danger to the nation as a whole, serious racial injustice is acknowledged and enjoined, but necessary remedies are not implemented once the economic or political irritant is removed.”).
55
Id. at 21 (“If, as I have suggested, rights for blacks require for survival a climate permeated with
white self-interest, those rights can be expected to wither in the far more hostile atmosphere that exists
when the interests and priorities of whites change.”).
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Professor Bell proceeded to identify four contemporaneous doctrinal
developments that he suggested revealed how white interests trump black
suffering in legal adjudication.56 Two of those doctrinal developments—
peremptory strikes in jury trials and available remedies for electoral districting—merit discussion here.57 With respect to the regime then governing the
use of peremptory strikes under Swain v. Alabama,58 Professor Bell complained about “jury discrimination decisions that protect black defendants
against trials by juries from which blacks have been systematically excluded, but refuse to condemn more sophisticated and no less effective
means of barring blacks from juries, particularly in those cases where racial
issues are important.”59 Advancing a similar critique with respect to electoral districting, Professor Bell allowed that the Court’s decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,60 which invalidated a districting plan in Tuskegee,
Alabama, that sought to exclude virtually all black voters from the district,
presented a helpful development for black electoral equality.61 Professor
Bell, however, found fault with the Court’s failure to prohibit more subtly
discriminatory districting schemes that result in vote dilution.62 While Professor Bell has packaged this thesis in somewhat different manners in his
numerous recountings over the years, the core theory has remained fundamentally unaltered since he first articulated it thirty-five years ago.
B. The Interest-Convergence Thesis
Where Racial Remediation primarily used a historical lens to examine
the subordination of black rights, Professor Bell’s Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma provided a distinctly more
future-oriented account of the possibility for attaining black advancement.
As its title suggests, Interest-Convergence used Brown and its accompany-

56

Id. at 14–16.
I emphasize these two doctrinal areas because I will return to them in my theoretical critique. See
infra text accompanying notes 195210. The other two areas that Professor Bell contended were indicative of his theory regarding black advancement were (1) due process requirements regarding expulsions
in public schools, and (2) the cooptation of NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), which held that the
application of a Virginia law to the NAACP’s activities violated the freedom to associate protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 1416.
58
380 U.S. 202 (1965).
59
Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 15–16 (footnote omitted).
60
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
61
Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 1516.
62
See id. at 16 (“[W]hen blacks seek to show that election districts are drawn or policies such as atlarge voting are followed that dilute seriously their political potential, they must prove that the lines or
policies were intended to have a racially discriminatory effect. This is not difficult in blatant situations
like the Tuskegee case, but it becomes almost impossible in many urban districts where there is no recent history of systematic exclusion and election officials are able to offer nonracial justifications for
boundaries and procedures that have a discriminatory effect.” (footnotes omitted)).
57
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ing history as a point of departure. Nonetheless, Interest-Convergence
principally contemplates what will be, rather than what has been.
Professor Bell positions Interest-Convergence as a response to Professor Herbert Wechsler’s famous (and infamous) article, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law.63 In Neutral Principles, Professor Wechsler pledged allegiance to Brown’s outcome on a personal level,64 but he also expressed grave skepticism about the decision’s constitutional
legitimacy.65 In Professor Wechsler’s view, Brown could not be justified as
invalidating a denial of equality to black citizens because such a theory requires an inquiry into the motives of the legislature.66 Rather than viewing
the problem posed by state-enforced school segregation as one of discrimination against blacks, Professor Wechsler contended that the problem
should be viewed as a denial of the freedom to associate—a theory that has
the virtue of applying to members of all racial groups.67 But this reconceptualization of the right denied by segregation did not resolve the matter.
“[I]f the freedom of association is denied by segregation,” Professor Wechsler suggested, “integration forces an association upon those for whom it is
unpleasant or repugnant.”68
Although Professor Bell emphasized his disagreement with Professor
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown as a normative matter,69 he offered a defense
63

See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 519 (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959)). Professor Wechsler’s article
caused quite a stir among legal academics. For particularly forceful responses to Neutral Principles’s
questioning of Brown’s constitutional legitimacy, see Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); and Louis Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
64
Wechsler, supra note 63, at 28–29.
65
Id. at 29. Neutral Principles is, of course, concerned with a good deal more than Brown’s constitutional legitimacy, but the Brown portion of the piece is its most controversial—and, not coincidentally,
its most memorable.
66
See id. at 33.
67
See id. at 34 (“Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by
the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may
be involved.”). Professor Wechsler’s concern with the associational implications of Brown finds an avatar in Zora Neale Hurston, who asked: “How much satisfaction can I get from a court order for somebody to associate with me who does not wish me near them?” Zora Neale Hurston, Court Order Can’t
Make Races Mix, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 11, 1955, reprinted in ZORA NEALE HURSTON, FOLKLORE,
MEMOIRS, AND OTHER WRITINGS 95658 (1995).
68
Wechsler, supra note 63, at 34 (“Given a situation where the state must practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid
it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail? I should like to think there is, but I confess that I have not yet written the opinion. To write it is for me the challenge of the school-segregation cases.”).
69
See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 522 (“To doubt that racial segregation
is harmful to blacks, and to suggest that what blacks really sought was the right to associate with whites,
is to believe in a world that does not exist now and could not possibly have existed then.”). Professor
Bell cast his lot with Professor Black, who “correctly viewed racial equality as the neutral principle
which underlay the Brown opinion.” Id.; see Black, supra note 63.
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of Neutral Principles as a descriptive matter.70 Neutral Principles appropriately emphasized Brown’s associational dimensions, according to Professor Bell, as governmental institutions prioritize the effect that racerelated decisions have on whites over the effect that such decisions have on
blacks.71 With this framework established, Professor Bell set forth the interest-convergence theory, which he cast as merely the positive expression
of the essential point in Neutral Principles:
Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown,
this principle of “interest convergence” provides: The interest of blacks in
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with
the interests of whites. However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone,
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for
blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle
and upper class whites.72

In brief, white interests, rather than black suffering, dictate the contours of
the Equal Protection Clause.73
Professor Bell suggested that international concerns principally motivated the Court’s decision in Brown—not the Court’s sudden awakening of
a long-dormant morality with respect to the subjugation of blacks.74 Citing
the Supreme Court’s desegregation and busing decisions from the 1970s,
Professor Bell contended that the temporary overlap of black and white interests evident in Brown had started to recede: “[R]ecent decisions, most
notably by the Supreme Court, indicate that the convergence of black and
white interests that led to Brown in 1954 and influenced the character of its
enforcement has begun to fade.”75 Professor Bell suggested that these altered conditions may result in “the realization of Professor Wechsler’s legi70

See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523. Professor Bell’s method of offering two cheers for Neutral Principles bears striking similarity to his treatment of Professor Alexander
Bickel’s prediction that Brown “may be headed fordread wordirrelevance.” ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 151 (1970). Bell wrote: “When, in 1970,
[Bickel] questioned the long-term viability of the Brown decision in a highly praised book, civil rights
lawyers and liberal scholars were annoyed. Few of us at that time had any doubts that we would eventually prevail in eradicating segregation ‘root and branch’ from the public schools. Now, more than
three decades later, Professor Bickel’s prediction, heavily criticized at the time, has become an unhappy
but all too accurate reality.” BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 94 (italics added).
71
See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523 (“[I]t is clear that racial equality
is not deemed legitimate by large segments of the American people, at least to the extent it threatens to
impair the societal status of whites. Hence, Wechsler’s [Neutral Principles] . . . suggests a deeper truth
about the subordination of law to interest-group politics with a racial configuration.”).
72
Id. (emphasis added).
73
See id.
74
See id. at 524–26. Given that blacks had long sought judicial relief from racial segregation in
educational facilities, Professor Bell asked: “What accounted, then, for the sudden shift in 1954 away
from the separate but equal doctrine and towards a commitment to desegregation?” Id. at 524 & n.31
(citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849)).
75
Id. at 526.
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timate fear that, if there is not a change of course, the purported entitlement
of whites not to associate with blacks in public schools may yet eclipse the
hope and the promise of Brown.”76
Turning to the road ahead, Professor Bell maintained that honoring
Brown’s promise was possible only to the extent that black interests failed
to diverge from white interests.77 Professor Bell hastened to add, however,
that black educational advancement did not necessarily require racial integration.78 Instead of pursuing racial integration at all costs, he suggested
that educational strategies should not dismiss the educational benefits that
can accompany racially isolated schools.79 Professor Bell closed by broadening his point, suggesting that racial progress more generally was predicated on harnessing the potential of the interest-convergence theory.80
C. Contemporary Views of the Interest-Convergence Thesis
Professor Bell’s support of the interest-convergence thesis has scarcely
diminished in the years since he first articulated it. Indeed, he has asserted
that the theory retains every bit of its vitality in the modern world. In his
book Silent Covenants, which bemoans the lack of progress achieved by the
fiftieth anniversary of Brown, Professor Bell explicitly rejected the notion
that the interest-convergence theory had lost its explanatory power: “It is
easy and perhaps tempting to rationalize the history of self-interest motivation in determining the direction of racial policymaking as an interesting if
troubling background, but hardly relevant in today’s more enlightened
world. There is, though, little indication that the favoring of white interests
over black has changed.”81
Professor Bell cites the continued elevation of white interests above
black interests as evidence that conditions for today’s African-Americans
are not fundamentally distinct from the conditions of their enslaved ancestors.82 As recently as 2004, Professor Bell suggested that the structural barriers to black progress are unlikely to end anytime soon because “of
entrenched beliefs about the relative importance of white and black humani-

76

Id. at 528.
Id.
78
Id. at 532.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 533 (“If [Brown] . . . is to remain viable, those who rely on it must exhibit the dynamic
awareness of all the legal and political considerations that influenced those who wrote it. Professor
Wechsler warned us early on that there was more to Brown than met the eye. . . . Criticism, as we in the
movement for minority rights have every reason to learn, is a synonym for neither cowardice nor capitulation. It may instead bring awareness, always the first step toward overcoming still another barrier in
the struggle for racial equality.”).
81
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 58.
82
See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 211 (5th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BELL,
RACE, RACISM].
77
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ty.”83 With these entrenched beliefs in mind, Professor Bell instructed readers to “[r]ecall the gradual emancipation plans, under which still-unborn
slaves would have to work most of their productive lives before they could
experience freedom” and contended that “[t]he difference in the condition
of slaves in one of the gradual emancipation states and black people today
is more of degree than of kind.”84 In a similar testament to what he perceives as the continuity of racial relations in the United States, Professor
Bell has contended that the absence of legally sanctioned segregation has
not resulted in a substantive decline in racial barriers85: “Despite our successful effort to strip the law’s endorsement from the hated ‘Jim Crow’
signs,” Professor Bell has written, “contemporary color barriers are less visible but neither less real nor less oppressive.”86
The lack of change in racial conditions that Professor Bell sees when
he surveys United States history, perhaps not surprisingly, compels him to
suggest that blacks will never attain full racial equality. “Racial equality is,
in fact, not a realistic goal,” Professor Bell has explained.87 “By constantly
aiming for a status that is unobtainable in a perilously racist America, black
Americans face frustration and despair.”88 Racial equality for blacks will
remain a permanently elusive goal because the racist structure will absorb
and adapt to any challenges: “Black people will never gain full equality in
this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories that
slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white
dominance.”89
II. ANALYTICAL FLAWS OF THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS
Despite its continued vitality and widespread acceptance, the interestconvergence theory’s explanatory power suffers from four principal analytical flaws. First, the interest-convergence theory’s usage of the terms
“black interests” and “white interests” ignores the deep intraracial disagreements regarding what constitutes progress and, more broadly, offers an
83

Id.
Id. The quoted passage continues: “Then, as now, blacks can progress in the society only when
that progress is perceived by the white majority as a clear benefit to whites, or at least not a serious
risk.” Id. For earlier declarations that conditions for blacks in the modern era bore a striking similarity
to conditions for slaves, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of
Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 16 (1979) [hereinafter Bell, Bakke].
85
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 374 (1992) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism].
86
Id.
87
Id. at 363; see DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM, at ix (1993) [hereinafter BELL, FACES] (“[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible
component of this society.”).
88
Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 85, at 363.
89
Id. at 373 (emphasis omitted).
84
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excessively narrow understanding of the term “interest.” Second, the theory
suggests that the severely limited instances of black progress demonstrate
that the racial status of whites and blacks has remained largely unchanged
since the demise of slavery. In reality, this contention ignores considerable
racial advancement and minimizes the circumstances that black people confronted when their lives were overwhelmingly controlled by the unvarnished racial prejudice of yesteryear. Third, the theory accords a near total
absence of agency to both black citizens and white citizens, including white
judges. Rather than merely waiting for moments of racial fortuity to strike,
blacks have played an important role in leading the nation’s quest for racial
equality, and they have been aided (and stymied) in that quest by white
judges along the way. Fourth, the theory either ignores racially egalitarian
decisions altogether or suggests that the judiciary issues decisions that appear to be racially egalitarian when doing so is necessary to avoid the destabilizing effects that would accompany validating a racially
discriminatory law. These two techniques work in concert to render the interest-convergence thesis incapable of refutation, meaning that the theory’s
validity cannot be assessed.
A. Interrogating the Composition of Racial Interests
A central component of the interest-convergence thesis stresses the
manner in which “black interests” are subordinated to “white interests.”90
Given that these two terms lie at the theory’s core, it is striking that Professor Bell never endeavors to define what, precisely, these terms mean. Although the terms may initially appear so obvious as to require no definition,
the oversight is significant because grappling with those terms reveals some
of the theory’s analytical limitations. Even if one accepts the notion that interests can be divvied up by race, the interest-convergence theory offers an
overly simplistic view of both the ability to identify and to express what
constitutes “black interests” and “white interests.”91 The thesis accords insufficient attention to the intraracial cleavages that divide the interests of
black people and white people. Thus, although Professor Bell uses the
terms “black interests” and “white interests,”92 the interest-convergence thesis too often views those entities as singular (“black interest” and “white interest”) rather than plural.
This view arguably contained at least some analytical coherence as applied to race relations in the United States prior to the end of Jim Crow. It
would be difficult to contend that the Court’s decision in, say, Dred Scott93

90

See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 52326.
See id. at 526.
92
See id.
93
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment,
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
91
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or Plessy94 did anything other than hurt the interest that black people collectively had in achieving racial equality. Over the course of the last half century, however, the racial situation in America has become increasingly
complex, and the interest-convergence thesis fails to appreciate that complexity. Given the numerous areas in the modern world where there is genuine disagreement regarding which policy decisions advance the interests of
black citizens, the interest-convergence theory’s elision of that complexity
misguidedly puts forth an undifferentiated and unqualified conception of
what constitutes “black interests.” Contrary to the notion advanced by the
interest-convergence ideology, however, there is no singular black agenda.95
In the democratic arena, for example, nearly everyone can agree that
ending expressly racial restrictions on access to the ballot box advanced the
interest of blacks in racial equality. But the creation of majority-minority
districts, pursuant to judicial interpretations of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, has spawned a fierce debate about whether such districts advance
black interests.96 After all, while black politicians appear to be more likely
to be elected from majority-minority districts, the electoral districts that surround the majority-minority districts are more white and more likely to
elect Republicans.97 While such a result may well be in the interest of black
politicians, reasonable minds can, and have, disagreed whether that result
advances the interests of black voters, the overwhelming majority of whom
tend to vote for Democrats.98 On a micro level, moreover, if the particular
black person in question happens to be a Republican, increasing the number
of Republican elected officials might well advance that individual’s conception of racial interests.
Similarly, serious disagreements about what precisely advances the interests of black citizens also appear in the realms of integration in grade
schools, affirmative action in higher education, and the administration of
criminal justice. With respect to the virtue of pursuing racial integration in
94

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), abrogated by Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(per curiam).
95
MARY PATTILLO, BLACK ON THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY 2
(2007) (dismissing the concept of a “unitary black political agenda”); see id. at 12 (“The fact of racial
homogeneity does not preclude the importance of difference, divisions, and distinctions.”).
96
See CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN
AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (2006); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and
the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1991).
97
See Pamela Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1705, 1733 (1993) (“Republicans have advanced a pure aggregation model of voting rights, assuming
that the creation of majority-black districts will deprive white Democrats of a critical element of their
base of support and thereby allow Republicans to win elections in predominantly white districts. This
convergence of their aggregative interests with those of minority voters led them to provide technical
assistance to minority groups seeking to draw plans that would increase the number of minority seats.”
(footnote omitted)).
98
Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1589,
1615 (2004).
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grade schools, many commentators have suggested that this method remains a viable strategy for alleviating racial hierarchy.99 Many other commentators, however, contend that, in light of the public school
demographics in urban areas, meaningful racial integration may no longer
be a realistic goal.100 Even apart from the practical difficulties of achieving
racial integration, Professor Bell himself has long offered incisive and provocative arguments against the wisdom of a headlong pursuit of racial integration.101 In the context of higher education and affirmative action,
Professor Richard Sander has advanced an empirical argument contending
that affirmative action in law school admissions serves to hinder black advancement in the legal profession.102 That claim, however, has generated
many rebuttals suggesting that black interests are in fact served by raceconscious admissions practices.103 With respect to the administration of
criminal justice, many commentators suggest that black interests would be
served by abandoning the aggressive policing of black communities that has
been partially responsible for a highly disproportionate number of black
people being ensnared by the legal system.104 At least one commentator has
argued, however, that such analyses elevate the interests of black criminals
over the interests of black victims.105
99

See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Why Segregation Is Inherently Unequal: The Abandonment of Brown and
the Continuing Failure of Plessy, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1041, 1051–52 (2004).
100
See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Parents Involved: Why Fifty Years of Experience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735, 739–40 (2008) (suggesting that
even ardent advocates of school integration must recognize that demographic realities make achieving
integration difficult).
101
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512 (1976) (claiming that NAACP lawyers elevated their
interest in achieving racial integration above their clients’ interest in obtaining a strong education independent of concerns regarding racial composition). For a thoughtful, historically based rejoinder to Professor Bell’s Serving Two Masters, see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local
Legal History Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003). More recently, Professor Bell authored a mock judicial opinion contending that the Supreme Court should have
affirmed Plessy and actually enforced the equal portion of the “separate but equal” doctrine. Derrick A.
Bell, Bell, J., Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185, 186 (Jack
M. Balkin ed., 2001) (“I regret that the Court fails to see in these cases the opportunity to lay bare the
simplistic hypocrisy of the ‘separate but equal’ standard, not by overturning Plessy, but by ordering its
strict enforcement.”).
102
See Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,
57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004).
103
See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho, Affirmative Action’s Affirmative Actions: A Reply to Sander, 114 YALE
L.J. 2011 (2005); David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to
Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915 (2005).
104
See Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 625, 670 (2006) (criticizing the “over-policing” of minority
neighborhoods and advocating a form of policing that rejects the aggressive enforcement of low-level,
nonviolent crimes).
105
See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (“[T]he principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement

167

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Even under the old system of outright black subordination, however, it
is at least plausible that determining precisely what decisions and policies
advanced “black interests” presents an oversimplified view of racial reality.
During Jim Crow’s reign, some black entrepreneurs owned businesses that
thrived at least in part because white businesspeople did not welcome business from black customers. It is quite conceivable, then, that at least some
members of the black elite did not welcome the destabilizing effects of segregation coming to a close.106 J.L. Chestnut, a black lawyer in Selma, Alabama, pressed this very point:
[T]he ties [that the black elite] had to the white ruling hierarchy—the ties that
established them as leaders—made them the least likely group of all to become
involved [in the civil rights struggle]. They had the most—the best jobs, the
largest homes—and therefore the most to lose.107

Thus, while the end of racial segregation on a broad level surely advanced
“black interests,” some black individuals who were thriving under the existing system must have viewed its demise as a bittersweet development: one
that was in a general sense good for the race, but that was also at least potentially bad for their pocketbooks.
Just as the interest-convergence thesis presents an exceedingly simple
approach to what constitutes “black interests,” so too does the thesis present
an overly facile approach to what constitutes “white interests.” Professor
Bell’s appreciation of the distinction between “middle and upper class
whites,”108 on the one hand, and “poorer whites,”109 on the other hand, offers
a measure of analytical nuance to the standard, broad-brushed interestconvergence analysis. But even this layer of complexity may simultaneously mask the conflicts and divisions that exist between and within these
groups. The interest-convergence theory’s clumping of middle-class whites
with upper-class whites110 may, for example, improperly lead to the conclusion that those two groups hold largely indistinguishable views on racial

of the laws.”). For a dispute over the wisdom of black jurors nullifying convictions of black criminal
defendants accused of committing nonviolent crimes, compare Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995), which extols the virtues
of jury nullification, with KENNEDY, supra, at 1228, 295310, which condemns jury nullification because such methods violate “the politics of respectability.”
106
See E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, BLACK BOURGEOISIE 111 (Simon & Schuster 1997) (1957) (“When
the Negroes started a campaign for their admission to the ‘white’ cinema and the ‘white’ restaurant, the
Negro political leader discouraged them and urged them to be loyal to Negro business enterprises.”).
107
J.L. CHESTNUT & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA 172 (1990).
108
Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523.
109
Id. at 52526.
110
Id. at 523, 52526.
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matters. Even within the white upper class, moreover, white citizens have
long voiced competing and conflicting views on the racial front.111
Setting aside the racial component of the interest-convergence theory,
it is worth observing that even the term “interest” can be understood to contain a good deal more complexity than Professor Bell generally allows. The
interest-convergence theory tends to view the idea of “interest” as a singular
and seemingly entirely self-interested concept. To be sure, people oftenusually, perhapsmake decisions based upon a narrow idea of what
will be good for them. But human beingscomplex creatures that they
aresometimes have multiple motivations for reaching their decisions. In
addition to raw material self-interest, there may be more idealized interests
involving concepts like honor, altruism, justice, and morality.112
To state this somewhat abstract point more concretely, contemplate
competing notions of how to understand the Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. Professor Bell, along with many other scholars of
constitutional law, emphasizes that the Court invalidated Jim Crow in elementary public school education during the 1950s because the system became an embarrassment to the United States during the Cold War.113 That
explanation may well account for some of the Court’s motivation behind
Brownalthough the historical evidence on that front is a good deal more
complicated than many scholars generally allow.114
111

See Eugene L. Horowitz, “Race” Attitudes, in CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO
139, 20305 (Otto Klineberg ed., 1944) (reporting divergent attitudes among northern college students
regarding racial equality).
112
Cf. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN (2010)
(noting that appeals to honor have motivated individuals and societies to alter their conduct); DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1991) (challenging the notion in public choice theory that voters, legislators, and interest groups invariably and exclusively act out of “pure greed”).
113
See supra text accompanying note 12.
114
This Article engages principally with the theoretical underpinnings of interest convergence rather than its historical claims. But two brief historical points merit mentioning here. First, during the
1950s, anti-Communist sentiment pervaded American society. Although many desegregation advocates
attempted to claim the mantle of anti-Communism, it is important to note that segregationists often
claimed that advocates of integration were in fact Communists. See JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY
EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945–1975, at 40 (2006) (“Soon after
the Brown decision, Senator Eastland charged that the Supreme Court was under communist control.
The Court has become ‘indoctrinated and brainwashed by left-wing pressure groups,’ Eastland contended. The Supreme Court justices must be communists, many white southerners agreed. Jewell
Lamm of Middlesex, North Carolina, wrote to her congressman, ‘Personally I think all nine of the old
political hacks ought to be exiled to Russia.’”). Second, if Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court
in Brown was exclusively or even principally motivated by anti-Communism, why did he neglect to
mention it? Chief Justice Warren’s opinion was, of course, written to be reprinted in newspapers around
the nation and was designed to maximize acceptance among white Southerners. See RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 699 (rev. & expanded ed. 2004) (1975) (noting that Chief Justice Warren wanted the
opinion to be “short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, nonaccusatory”). It seems reasonable to believe that even an oblique statement regarding America’s place
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But this explanation for the outcome in Brown may also be regarded as
incomplete. For better or worse, widespread international disapproval has
not historically been a sufficient condition to result in an alteration of
American practices.115 It also seems distinctly possible that the Court found
Jim Crow to be an international embarrassment because the practice clashed
with its more abstract interests in justice and equality. Segregation may
have embarrassed some whites (including those on the Court) during the
1950s, that is, because they came to regard the system as unjust. Attempting to assign relative value to discrete motivations, especially when dealing
with a multimember body, is necessarily a speculative enterprise. The interest-convergence thesis, however, often expresses certainty where it
should admit doubt, confidently identifying a lone interest where several
motivations may be at work.116
In its crudest form, the interest-convergence theory can be understood
as sharing some affinities with early articulations of law and economics. In
the world of law and economics, people are regarded as rational utility maximizers;117 in the world of interest convergence, people attempt to maximize
the utility of racial advantage. It also seems worth noting that the logic of
this skeptical worldview does not necessarily limit itself to whites. Indeed,
the interest-convergence ideology’s steadfast denial of a genuine white interest in promoting equality and justice for its own sake may be understood
as applying to blacks, too. Under this way of thinking, the reason that black
people have sought racial equality is not because they believe that racial
equality is inherently a just cause but because they believe that achieving
racial equality will redound to their benefit. Thus, under the interestin the world or the Cold War may have been a powerful rhetorical point in achieving the Chief Justice’s
aims. Although it may be objected that a Cold War reference would be improper in a Supreme Court
opinion, there are at least two responses: (1) the brief filed by the United States government made the
argument, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6–8, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (No. 8), 1952 WL 82045, at *6–8, and (2) Brown is not exactly known for its adherence to traditional legal authorities, see Brown, 347 U.S. at 49495 n.11 (citing psychological studies on the effects
of segregation).
115
For example, despite widespread prohibition of the death penalty in Europe, the United States
continues to uphold the death penalty. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (upholding imposition of capital punishment in the form of lethal injection). Similarly, the Court has upheld the right to
gun ownership in the face of European prohibitions on handgun ownership. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to possess firearms in the home for self-defense).
116
Professor Bell’s early articulation of the interest-convergence theory allowed some space for
multiple motivations. See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 12 (suggesting that among the
factors explaining Brown was “a humane as well as politically aware Supreme Court”). But such allowances have generally receded from Professor Bell’s analysis.
117
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 1 (1981) (“Although the traditional
subject of economics is indeed the behavior of individuals and organizations in markets, a moment’s
reflection on the economist’s basic analytical tool for studying markets will suggest the possibility of
using economics more broadly. That tool is the assumption that people are rational maximizers of their
satisfactions.”).
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convergence theory, claims of injusticeeven when articulated by racial
minoritiescan be dismissed as unprincipled and pretextual, merely a highminded manner of complaining that their own ox has been gored. After all,
why should members of oppressed groups be the only individuals who are
capable of making claims to justice and equality that do not reek of selfinterest? The interest-convergence ideology so understood can be interpreted as undermining the legitimacy of claims by blacks to racial equality.118
B. Consistency and Inconsistency of Racial Status
The interest-convergence theory holds that, because black people receive relief from racial oppression only when it suits the interests of the
white establishment, the status of blacks and the status of whites remained
relatively constant throughout the latter half of the twentieth century—and
perhaps even throughout the nation’s entire history. According to Professor
Bell, as discussed above,119 the interest-convergence theory at work
throughout United States history links contemporary racial developments to
the unvarnished racism of seemingly bygone eras. This misperception—
that the status of blacks and whites has been characterized by continuity rather than change during the last several decades—erroneously minimizes
one of the leading transformations of American society during that time.
One need not believe that racism has been completely vanquished or that
there is no longer any advantage associated with whiteness to acknowledge
that the status of both racial groups has experienced profound transformations since World War II.
1. Status of Blacks.—Professor Bell has long asserted that the interest-convergence theory reveals how contemporary blacks have a good deal
in common with their enslaved ancestors: “The difference in the condition
of slaves in one of the gradual emancipation states and black people today
is more of degree than of kind.”120 Under this view, the fall of Jim Crow
was largely a formality, as conditions for African-Americans in the modern
era retain an eerie similarity to the days of yore. Even though signs indicating separate water fountains for blacks and whites have long since disappeared, Professor Bell asserts that “contemporary color barriers are less
visible but neither less real nor less oppressive.”121
While it may seem that to state this point is to refute it, arguments asserting an absence of genuine racial change for contemporary black citizens
are surprisingly widespread. Indeed, in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the tremendous strides that the United States has made with re118

By extension, this analysis applies with equal force to claims of social justice made by members
of other oppressed groups on their own behalf.
119
See supra Part I.
120
Bell, Bakke, supra note 84, at 16; see also BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 82, at 211.
121
Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 85, at 374.
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spect to race relations since World War II,122 the notion that conditions have
improved for blacks only on the margins enjoys prominent support both in
the legal academy123 and in the larger culture.124 Accordingly, it is necessary
to observe that the racial existence of blacks in modern America would be
unrecognizable, and perhaps even unfathomable, to their enslaved forefathers. Contending that the existence of blacks today can be analogized to
people who were literally (not metaphorically) denied their freedom or to
people who had their liberty thoroughly circumscribed by Jim Crow minimizes the suffering of individuals who endured the yoke of unrelenting racial oppression.
While the goal of racial equality has certainly not yet been fully realized, the racial progress that has been made over the generations has dramatically elevated the racial status of blacks. Examples abound of racial
progress for blacks in their everyday lives.125 To appreciate the genuine racial progress that has been made, it is necessary merely to recall the Supreme Court’s statements in notorious cases openly acknowledging and
affirming the inferior social status of blacks. In Dred Scott v. Sandford,
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion stated that, in the eyes of the Framers, blacks
“had for more tha[n] a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior
122

See Marshall H. Medoff, Discrimination and the Occupational Progress of Blacks Since 1950,
44 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 295, 295 (1985) (finding that “the occupational position of Blacks relative to
Whites showed substantial improvement between 1950 and 1980 in both the North and South and the
United States as a whole”); Tamar Jacoby, Whatever Became of Integration?, WASH. POST, June 28,
1998, at C2 (“Blacks as a group have made enormous progress in the past three or four decades. The
black middle class has quadrupled, education levels have soared and blacks are increasingly represented
in electoral politics and other influential realms of national life.”).
123
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 2 (2010) (“What has changed since the collapse of Jim Crow has less to do with the
basic structure of our society than with the language we use to justify it. . . . We have not ended racial
caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.”); Charles Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and
the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REV. 15, 23 (2003) (“[T]he only difference between lynching
and capital punishment is the gloss of legality and procedural regularity that the latter enjoys. In this
regard, application of the death penalty may be fairer than the vigilante justice that characterized the Jim
Crow era, but not by much.”).
124
See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES
RACE RELATIONS WORSE 67 (2008) (describing how pop singer Prince claimed that his record label
had made him a “slave”).
125
Philip Elman, who worked in the Solicitor General’s office during the fall of Jim Crow, offers a
pithy portrait of black life in Washington, D.C., before the Court deemed state-sanctioned racial segregation impermissible. Philip Elman, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil
Rights Litigation, 1946–1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 82324 (1987) (“You have to
remember that in 1952 the District of Columbia was a southern city; it had separate black and white
school systems. Negroes were barred from eating in downtown restaurants. The only places they could
eat were in the black ghettos. If Thurgood Marshall came to Washington to argue a case in the Supreme
Court, he could not stay in a downtown hotel; he had to go out to Fourteenth and U Street, to the Dunbar
Hotel. Even at the Supreme Court, the only blacks were messengers. There was no black in the Clerk’s
or Marshall’s office, no black on the police force; they were considered white man’s jobs. It seems incredible today, but that’s the way it was not too long ago.”).
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order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social
or political relations.”126 In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court made the thenunremarkable point that a black man “is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.”127 Not only would such arguments no longer
appear in the U.S. Reports but they would no longer be uttered in polite
company. The significance of that change cannot be underestimated.
The Supreme Court has, moreover, played at least some role in closing
the gap between the status of blacks and the status of whites. While many
Supreme Court cases involving race received a great deal of attention because they seemed dramatic, it is perhaps most helpful here to remember a
case that affected the quotidian. Not long ago, black people were typically
denied the honor of being addressed formally, even in formal settings.
Among the list of racial slights that Martin Luther King Jr. listed in his Letter from Birmingham City Jail as justifying his civil disobedience was the
refusal of white people to accord blacks the respect of using formal titles:
I guess it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation
to say, “Wait.” But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and
fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; . . . when your first
name becomes “nigger” and your middle name becomes “boy” . . . and when
your wife and mother are never given the respected title “Mrs.” . . . then you
will understand why we find it difficult to wait.128

One year after King wrote his celebrated letter, the Supreme Court decided
Hamilton v. Alabama.129 In that case, the Supreme Court reversed the contempt conviction of a black woman who refused to answer questions addressed to “Mary” as opposed to “Miss Hamilton.” Hamilton thus offers a
prime instance of the judiciary refusing to permit black citizens to be treated
with diminished status before the law. And in so doing, Hamilton
represents a sharp break from the past in a way that is at once simple and
profound.
2. Status of Whites.—Professor Bell suggests that the principal interest that whites are motivated to protect is their “superior societal status” as
compared to blacks.130 The interest-convergence theory provides that “it is
126

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
127
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896), abrogated by Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) (per curiam).
128
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 292–93 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
129
376 U.S. 650 (1964).
130
Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523. Professor Bell has sometimes explicitly suggested that racial “status” includes an economic component. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Waiting
on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 345 (1975) (“Full implementation of
Brown remains an uncertain future prospect because of the continuing resistance of many whites who

173

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

clear that racial equality is not deemed legitimate by large segments of the
American people, at least to the extent it threatens to impair the societal status of whites.”131 If there is a conflict between white status, on the one
hand, and black rights, on the other, there is no question that white status
will prevail.132
The increasing status of blackness is, of course, intimately connected
to the decreasing status of whiteness as an automatic entitlement to exalted
social standing. As blacks and other people of color have received the dignitary effects traditionally reserved for whites, it follows that whiteness, on
its own, has decreased in value. Justice Stanley Reed keenly felt that decreased value of whiteness after the Supreme Court agreed to a tentative
resolution at its conference in the case of District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co.133 In that case, the Court considered whether restaurants in
Washington, D.C., could continue to prohibit black people from dining on
the premises. Justice Reed, who lived with his wife at Washington’s Mayflower Hotel, was reported to have said after the Court agreed unanimously
in conference to invalidate the racial restrictions on dining in the nation’s
capital: “Why—why this means that a nigra can walk into the restaurant at
the Mayflower and sit down to eat at the table right next to Mrs. Reed!”134
Where it once would have been risible to suggest that whites benefit
from cross-racial interactions, by 1972 a unanimous Burger Court held in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. that—in the face of racially
discriminatory rental practices—white plaintiffs have standing to sue for the
“loss of important benefits from interracial associations.”135 Assuming that
antidiscrimination law is, as Professor Wechsler posited, fundamentally
about the right of association,136 the Court made it clear well before Professor Bell articulated the interest-convergence theory that it would not permit
whites’ desire for strictly intraracial interactions to trump the desire for interracial contact. In considerable tension with a central tenet of interest
convergence, Trafficante illustrates the Court’s rejection of whites’ interest
in maintaining racial exclusivity as a ground for protecting white social superiority.
None of the foregoing should be interpreted as contending that whites
are not accorded certain benefits as a result of their race that are routinely
denied to blacks. Indeed, race and racial considerations continue to exercise meaningful influence on the lives of Americans of all races. I mean to
fear that the realization of ‘equal educational opportunities’ for blacks will mean the loss of economic
and status benefits that they and their children now enjoy solely on the basis of race.”).
131
Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 523.
132
See id.
133
346 U.S. 100 (1953).
134
KLUGER, supra note 114, at 598.
135
409 U.S. 205, 209–10, 212 (1972).
136
Wechsler, supra note 63, at 34.
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suggest merely that whiteness qua whiteness has decreased in status as
black citizenship and humanity have become everyday features of American life.137 Although a good deal of my analysis focuses on improvements
in race relations, that focus should not be taken as an indication that I believe racial prejudice no longer exists, or even that it imposes merely negligible effects on racial minorities. Conditions are far from perfect on
America’s racial front, a fact that is never more apparent than during difficult economic times.138 Acknowledging racism’s continued effects does not
mean, however, that it is impossible to acknowledge simultaneously that the
racial progress blacks have achieved since World War II has been anything
less than profound.139
C. Lack of Agency
The interest-convergence thesis accords an almost complete absence of
agency to two groups of actors who exercise a great deal of control regarding the advancement of black interests: the black citizenry and the white judiciary.140 By implicitly encouraging black citizens to await the magical
moment when their interests converge with the white majority, the interestconvergence thesis sharply discounts the capacity of black people to participate in their own uplift. Conversely, by reducing white judges to mere
functionaries who do the bidding of the white establishment, the interestconvergence thesis simultaneously diminishes the culpability of white
judges who exercise their authority to maintain the existing racial hierarchy
and denies the credit owed to white members of the judiciary who challenge
that hierarchy.
137

See SOKOL, supra note 115, at 4 (“The civil rights movement altered race relations, overturned
ingrained practices, subverted traditions, ushered in political change, transformed institutions, undermined a way of life, and even turned cities upside down . . . .”).
138
See, e.g., Michael Powell, Decades of Gains Vanish for Blacks in Memphis, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2010, at A1 (noting that “rising unemployment and growing foreclosures in the recession have combined to destroy black wealth and income and erase two decades of slow progress”).
139
See Michael Powell, 45 Years Later, Witnesses to Dr. King’s Dream See a New Hope, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2008, at A1 (reporting the comments of Congressman and former civil rights activist
John Lewis who said, “When people say nothing has changed, I feel like saying, ‘Come walk in my
shoes.’”).
140
There are, of course, nonblack citizens and nonwhite judges who are important actors in shaping
American race relations. This Article addresses black citizens and white judges because they are, from
the interest-convergence vantage point, at the opposite ends of society’s power structure. It is worth noting, though, that Professor Bell does not discuss black members of the judiciary in the context of the interest-convergence theory. Were interest-convergence adherents to contemplate black judges, they
might advance two principal arguments. First, they might contend that black people who are sufficiently
palatable to the establishment so as to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate are,
virtually by definition, disinclined to seek profound racial reform. Cf. Lewis M. Steel, A Critic’s View
of the Warren Court—Nine Men in Black Who Think White, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1968, § 6 (Magazine),
at 56. Second, they might contend that, even assuming that a few right-thinking black judges could
sneak through the process with their righteous views undetected, not enough such judges could be confirmed so as to make any meaningful difference in the lives of black people.
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1. Black Citizens.—The interest-convergence theory’s assertion that
blacks are permitted to advance only when white interests permit them to
do so offers an inaccurately anemic conception of the ability of black
people to create change on their own behalf. The theory’s emphasis on fortune and happenstance illuminates the theory’s low regard for black agency.141 Although Professor Bell briefly acknowledges that black people are
not in fact inanimate objects, he makes it clear that their actions play an extremely limited role in shaping racial reality. Professor Bell writes:
Blacks are not neutral observers in their subordinate status, but even their most
strenuous efforts seldom enable them to break free of a social physics in which
even the most blatant discrimination is ignored or rationalized until black petitions find chance harmony with white interests. Racial justice, then, when it
comes, arrives on the wings of racial fortuity rather than hard-earned entitlement. Its departure, when conditions change, is preordained.142

Rather than black advancement being principally driven by canny litigation
strategies, political mobilization, or other modes of self-assertion, interest
convergence instead views black people as mere “fortuitous beneficiaries”
and instructs them to expect (even fleeting) advances toward racial equality
only if they possess the good luck to have their interests be perceived as
aligning with those of whites.143
141

BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 59 (“While blacks had been petitioning the courts
for decades to find segregation unconstitutional, by 1954 a fortuitous symmetry existed between what
blacks sought and what the nation needed.”). Professor Bell was not, of course, the only person who
viewed Brown as the product of fortuity. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter famously viewed the unanimous
decision in Brown as the result of divine fortune. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 57 (2001) (describing how Justice Felix Frankfurter called the death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson “the first indication I have ever had
that there is a God”).
142
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 9.
143
Again, Professor Bell’s early formulation of the interest-convergence thesis demonstrated considerably greater awareness of both black agency and the need to pursue multiple strategies for racial
reform simultaneously. See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 28 (“The quest for racial equality cannot be delegated. Programs and policies should be structured to harmonize with the principle: ‘no
one can free black people but themselves.’”); id. at 14 (“[T]he quest by blacks for racial justice has resulted in dozens of major court decisions that led to social reforms of general significance. These decisions are seldom society’s gifts. The litigation is usually carefully planned and intelligently executed.”
(footnote omitted)). Such statements, alas, seldom appeared in subsequent iterations of the interestconvergence thesis and were typically watered down when they did appear. See, e.g., BELL, SILENT
COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 71 (“[R]acial policy actions may be influenced, but are seldom determined, by the seriousness of the harm blacks are suffering, by the earnest petitions they have argued in
courts, by the civil rights bills filed in legislative chambers, or even by impressive protests conducted in
the streets. None of these change blacks’ status as fortuitous beneficiaries.”).
This strikingly passive approach to agency afflicts many adherents to the interest-convergence
theory. For example, Professor Yoshino contends, in explaining Professor Bell’s thesis, that Brown
“happened in part because” of the Cold War. See Yoshino, supra note 35. Supreme Court cases do not,
of course, simply “happen[]”; rather, parties brief cases, and Supreme Court Justices decide those cases.
See also Lubinski, supra note 31, at 412 (“The [interest-convergence] theory . . . provides animal advocates with the rhetoric required for a successful campaign and the precedent to persist—eventually the
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The interest-convergence theory risks reducing black people to the role
of bystanders to the events of American history, individuals who occasionally get swept up in the current of world affairs but have a negligible role in
shaping those affairs. So limited is their ability to shape their own realities,
so complete is their subordination, that, in the absence of racial fortuity,
struggling against the prevailing racial order constitutes an exercise in futility. In a passage that illuminates blacks’ supposed inability to shape the
world around them, Professor Bell contends: “It is as though black people
are trapped in a giant, unseen gyroscope. Even their most powerful exertions fail either to divert the gyroscopic prison from its preplanned equilibrium, or to alter its orientation toward dominance for whites over
blacks.”144
Black people, however, are not trapped in invisible gyroscopes. Nor
are they potted plants. Even in the context of the brutally dehumanizing institution of slavery, black people were able to exercise various modes of resistance and exert at least some control within their thoroughly unenviable
environments.145 More recently, the civil rights movement—with both its
legal component conceived of by Charles Hamilton Houston146 and the direct action component principally identified with Martin Luther King
Jr.147—demonstrates that black people can assert their rights and succeed in
bringing about real racial change even in the face of stifling racial oppression. Rather than waiting for fortune to smile upon them, these black
people—and many more over the centuries—took fortune into their own
hands and helped bend history to their will. Viewing African-Americans as
mere “fortuitous beneficiaries” who are trapped in a “preplanned equilibrium” improperly suggests that the decisions and actions of black people
are far less important, tending toward the irrelevant, in comparison with
what whites deem permissible. In this manner, an absolutist conception of
interest convergence may place an artificial limit upon what black people
can achieve.
The interest-convergence theory’s minimization of black agency also
may have the regrettable effect of undermining the achievement of individstars will align and breakthroughs will ensue.”). Although Lubinski’s excerpted analysis sounds almost
satirical, read in context it appears to be sincere.
144
BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 10, at 77.
145
See, e.g., STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE
RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION (2003).
146
See generally KLUGER, supra note 114, at 125–31, 147–56 (providing Houston’s biography and
detailing his involvement in the campaign for civil rights); GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 13155 (1983) (describing Houston’s work as Special Counsel for the NAACP); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987) (discussing the NAACP legal strategy).
147
See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 8586 (First Quill 1999) (1986); see also Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999,
102024 (1989) (describing King’s background and involvement in the beginning of the bus boycotts).
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ual blacks. In the event that a black person should achieve distinction in the
professional world, interest convergence suggests that the white establishment permitted that black person’s achievement as a small concession necessary to advance white interests and maintain racial order.148 “Successful
blacks serve white interests by providing the rationalizing link between the
nation’s espousal of racial equality and its practice of racial dominance,”
Professor Bell has written. “The unspoken and totally facetious maxim is
that with self-improvement, the opportunity is available for all blacks to be
successful.”149 While it would certainly go too far to suggest that black
people exercise no control whatsoever regarding their occupational fates
under the interest-convergence theory, the talent of the black individuals,
say, in the laboratory or in the archives would appear to be relatively inconsequential in comparison to the white interests that select a small number of
blacks to succeed. The interest-convergence theory might be understood as
viewing a successful individual black person less as a role model and more
as a miragean illusion that succeeds principally in legitimating black
subordination.150
To be sure, the interest-convergence theory does not wholly remove all
traces of black agency. When the theory does allow for black agency, however, the amount of influence accorded black people over their own fates is
a decidedly marginal phenomenon. In his analysis of Brown, for instance,
Professor Bell observes that the NAACP’s brief in the case, in addition to
the Solicitor General’s amicus brief, argued that invalidating segregated
schools could aid the nation in waging the Cold War.151 Similarly, Professor Bell praises the efforts of the lawyers who won Grutter and Gratz for
trumpeting the importance of diversity in an effort to appeal to the interestconvergence impulse.152 Interest-convergence theory puts forth a severely
148

See Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 24.
Id.
150
Professor Bell’s emphasis on the legitimation aspect of black success may well stem from a desire to avoid a sense of complacency on the part of individuals who are now interested in pursuing racial
equality. This anti-complacency motivation may also account for his insistence that America’s racial
climate remains largely unchanged since slavery. Although I share Professor Bell’s concern that profound racial inequality continues to plague this nation, we appear to part company regarding which tactics will prove most helpful in addressing that inequality. In contrast to Professor Bell, it is my sense
that forthrightly acknowledging considerable racial progress willin addition to having the virtue of
striking people as accurateprevent individuals from believing that racial problems are intractable. Of
course, it is also distinctly possible that a combination of approaches may well prove most effective in
combating racial inequality.
151
See Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 10, at 524 (“[T]he decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds
of emerging third world peoples. At least this argument was advanced by lawyers for both the NAACP
and the federal government.”).
152
See Bell, Unintended Lessons, supra note 49, at 1066 (“Once revealed as a motivating factor, interest convergence can be transformed into useful strategy. Those that defended the University of Michigan’s affirmative action plans, for example, utilized interest convergence by promoting diversity as
149
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crabbed understanding of what black individuals and other advocates of
black advancement can do to achieve racial uplift. Appealing to interestconvergence sentiments is surely a valuable tool, but it should not be regarded as the only tool that is available. Because notions of interest can be
so complex and varied,153 it seems misguided to appeal only to an extremely
narrow conception of self-interest. Confining black agency to operating
within the interest-convergence paradigm artificially serves to constrain racial possibilities.
2. White Judges.—Just as the interest-convergence theory improperly
minimizes the agency of black citizens, it does the same to white citizens.
The denial of agency to one particular group of white citizenswhite
judgesmerits scrutiny here in light of their perceived centrality to implementing the interest-convergence thesis. Indeed, the theory is predicated on
the belief that legal decisions involving race are not made by individual
judges who choose from a range of judicial determinations but instead are
driven by a seemingly compelled predisposition to maintaining racial hierarchy. This minimization at once denies culpability to members of the
judiciary who have ratified racism through their decisions and denies credit
to members of the judiciary who have rejected racism. Although judges not
infrequently make value-laden assessments regarding competing ideals in
writing judicial decisions,154 the interest-convergence theory incorrectly
views judges primarily as mere automatons who almost invariably maximize the interests of whites.
While the interest-convergence theory appropriately suggests that more
motivated the Supreme Court’s racially egalitarian decisions than moral
outrage at the injustice of legally sanctioned racism, the theory incorrectly
gives short shrift to the moral agency that was central to those decisions.155
In the middle third of the twentieth century, an all-white Supreme Court issued a number of decisions that confronted the racist treatment of blacks in
a variety of contexts, including the electoral,156 residential,157 and, yes, the
educational.158 To pretend that such decisions, and similar decisions in the
being in the self-interest of the University. Interest convergence was part of their strategy, planned for
in advance, rather than a happy coincidence recognized in retrospect.” (footnote omitted)).
153
See supra Part II.A.
154
See KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 57.
155
On the moral implications of Brown, see J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE
SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 62 (1979) (“No single decision has had more moral force
than Brown; few struggles have been morally more significant than the one for the racial integration of
American life.”).
156
See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (protecting a citizen’s right to participate
in primary elections).
157
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (deeming racially restrictive covenants
uneforceable).
158
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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lower courts, were produced by a judiciary that was concerned primarily
with maintaining whites’ superior position in society denies those judges
the plaudits that they deserve for issuing those decisions.159
A central part of the interest-convergence theory’s conspiratorial outlook is the casting of Supreme Court Justices in the role of omniscient conspirators. Under the interest-convergence theory, Justices resemble less a
collection of individuals with varying ideological commitments than an undifferentiated mass composed of diabolical seers who are dedicated to prolonging black subordination by protecting white interests.160 The interestconvergence theory does not allow that judicial decisions involving race
may result in unintended consequences. Instead, under the interestconvergence theory, the Supreme Court issues decisions with an intent, and
those decisions seemingly invariably have their desired effect.161 Rather
than being all-knowing demigods, however, there is ample reason to believe
that Justices often fail to appreciate the impact that their decisions will ultimately have on the nation.162 This statement, it has been argued, applies
with particular force regarding the Court’s decisions involving race.163
While the history of the United States judiciary does not want for unreconstructed racists,164 it is important to honor the judges who have affirmatively rejected racism. To take but one example, Judge J. Waties Waring of
159

See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 110 (2003) (“Because the Court in Brown was
deeply committed as a matter of professional belief to the constitutional value of nondiscrimination, it
was willing to undertake extraordinary efforts to transform constitutional culture.”).
160
Professor Bell has, on at least two occasions, singled out particular Justices for writing opinions
worthy of praise. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California’s Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the
Road to Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 145758 (1997) (praising Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting), for
encouraging the Court to acknowledge the constitutional distinction between programs designed to perpetuate racial subordination and programs designed to eradicate racial subordination); Bell, Diversity’s
Distractions, supra note 10, at 1624 (praising Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), for its acknowledgement that the current racial disparities are owed to historical injustices). It is no coincidence that both of these opinions are in dissent.
161
See, e.g., Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 6 (“[E]ven a rather cursory look at American legal history suggests that in the past, the most significant political advances for blacks resulted
from policies which were intended and had the effect of serving the interests and convenience of whites
rather than remedying racial injustices against blacks . . . .”).
162
See LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008, at 279
(2009) (contending that none of the Justices realized that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would become an intensely reviled decision); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,
362–63 (1995) (observing that, although the Supreme Court may have thought that its decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), inflicted a fatal blow to the practice of capital punishment within
the United States, that decision may have in fact helped to revive the practice).
163
See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 15, at 389–408 (suggesting that Brown did not bring integration
to the South but that it did succeed in eliminating the space for Southern moderate politicians on the racial question).
164
See id. at 81 (labeling Justice James McReynolds “a notorious racist”).
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South Carolina issued opinions regarding blacks that challenged the racial
hierarchy so thoroughly that white racists drove him from his home, forcing
him to retire from the bench and to flee his home state for New York
City.165 In a dissent in Briggs v. Elliott,166 one of the five cases that eventually became known as Brown v. Board of Education, Judge Waring expressly conceived of racial segregation as a moral problem: “[S]egregation
in education can never produce equality and . . . is an evil that must be eradicated. . . . [T]he system of segregation in education adopted and practiced
in the State of South Carolina must go and must go now. Segregation is per
se inequality.”167 Moral agency motivated Judge Waring’s opinion attacking segregation in Briggs, just as it motivated the majority opinion in Briggs
that defended segregation. Denying the credit that is owed to the Judge
Warings of the world is unwise because judges will be unlikely to issue
progressive decisions on raceor other legal areas involving inequalityif
they believe that their decisions will ultimately be understood as only protecting the prevailing order. The interest-convergence theory’s minimization of agency thus provides a myopic view of judicial behavior in all its
moral dimensions.
D. Irrefutability
The interest-convergence theory is also marred by the impossibility of
refuting its validity. In responding to Grutter, Professor Bell allows himself
some measure of “a prophet’s pride” because, in his view, the Court embraced affirmative action in light of the policy being pitched as advancing
establishment interests.168 Like many self-styled prophets, however, Professor Bell can tout his foresight not least because he espouses a view of the
world that is fundamentally incapable of being falsified by subsequent
events. All judicial decisions involving race can, if subjected to sufficiently
intense scrutiny, be understood to affirm the existence of the interestconvergence theory at work.169 The interest-convergence theory’s irrefutability, moreover, is intensified by Professor Bell’s tendency to minimize
and ignore data points that appear to refute or even complicate the thesis.
165

See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 10 (1961). Another example of a federal judge who was driven from the South is
Judge J. Skelly Wright of Louisiana, who was labeled by local whites “Judas Wright” and “a traitor to
his class.” PATTERSON, supra note 141, at 107; see also PELTASON, supra, at 237 (describing how Louisiana legislators called for Judge Wright’s imprisonment and condemned President-elect Kennedy for
refusing to repudiate Judge Wright); see generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (Univ. of Ala. Press
1990) (1981) (chronicling the Fifth Circuit’s response to the Court’s decree of “all deliberate speed” in
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), focusing upon Judges Richard Rives, John Brown, John Minor Wisdom,
and Elbert Tuttle).
166
98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
167
Id. at 547–48 (emphasis omitted).
168
Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, supra note 10, at 1624.
169
For an early critique of this point, see Litowitz, supra note 37, at 525–26.
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1. Contradiction-Closing Cases.—In his Foreword to the Harvard
Law Review, Professor Bell explains why some cases that might initially be
viewed as racial advances reveal themselves to be, upon closer inspection,
merely legitimations of the prevailing racial hierarchy.170 If legal rules expose the underpinnings of racism in an excessively blatant manner,171 the interest-convergence theory provides that the judiciary may grant some relief
to black people because doing so serves larger white societal interests:
namely, an interest in the appearance of meritocracy and an interest in the
social stability necessary to avoid racial unrest. Professor Bell dubs these
ostensible victories for racial equality “contradiction closing cases,” because “they narrow the gap between white and black rights that the framers
wrote into the Constitution.”172 Contradiction-closing cases “serve as a
shield against excesses in the exercise of white power, yet they bring about
no real change in the status of blacks.”173 Professor Bell suggests that such
cases “provide[] blacks and liberals with the sense that the system is not so
bad after all.”174 Professor Richard Delgado has further explained that contradiction-closing cases occur “when the gap between our ideals and a pervasively racist reality grows too large. Such cases legitimate a generally
indifferent legal system, permitting dominant society to believe that it is fair
and just.”175
The manner in which the interest-convergence theory can accommodate any decision that appears to reject racial hierarchy can be glimpsed in
Professor Bell’s recent reassessment of Brown.176 Apart from emphasizing
the decision’s roots in geopolitical considerations, Professor Bell now
views Brown as a decision that advanced racism by appearing to reject racism. “You would never know it from the opposition and determined resistance of so many whites,” Professor Bell has written, “but the Brown
170

Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court 1984 Term—Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles,
99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985) [hereinafter Bell, Foreword]. It seems worth noting here that Professor Bell
was the first, and for more than thirty years the only, black law professor to ever write the Foreword for
the Harvard Law Review, perhaps the most esteemed platform that exists in legal academia. Professor
Guinier recently became the second member of that exclusive club. See Lani Guinier, The Supreme
Court 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008).
171
See Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32. Even expressing the notion that white people would
be “shock[ed]” or “embarrass[ed]” by blatant racism, id., evinces a great deal of progress on the racial
front.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 18, at 2294 n.133 (citation omitted); see also Richard Delgado,
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 923–24
(1988) [hereinafter Delgado, Will We Ever Be Saved?] (reviewing BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 18) (“[O]ur system of civil rights statutes and case law serves a homeostatic function, assuring
that society has exactly the right amount of racism: Too little would forfeit psychic and financial benefits, too much would risk disruption.”).
176
Bell, Unintended Lessons, supra note 49.
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decision was actually a good deal for white Americans.”177 Professor Bell
explained that the Court’s school desegregation decision provided a misleading appearance of meritocracy: “The Brown decision’s rejection of the
racial barriers imposed by segregation . . . reinforced the fiction that the
path of progress was clear. Everyone could and should succeed through individual ability and effort.”178 This foregoing analysis suggests that it is
whites, not blacks, who prevail when racial barriers fall because the erosion
of such barriers perpetuates the myth of racial equality.
That a decision rejecting racial hierarchy in fact must be understood as
reinforcing racial hierarchy lays bare the essential irrefutability of the interest-convergence thesis. Judicial decisions that seem to undermine the thesis
are seamlessly transformed into confirmations of the thesis. Instead of calling out “heads, I win; tails, you lose,” the interest-convergence thesis simply substitutes “heads, white people win; tails, black people lose.”
The interest-convergence theory also accounts for judicial decisions
that advance racial equality by claiming that such decisions were inevitable
because the statutes or laws that the Court invalidated were simply too brazen in their advancement of racial subordination. Contradiction-closing
cases, the interest-convergence theory posits, reveal that blacks “can depend
on the courts . . . for the correction of racial outrages.”179 But viewing judicial decisions as mere “correction[s] of racial outrages” denies the existence, and even the possibility, of obtaining genuine victories on the road to
racial equality. Indeed, even the term “correction of racial outrages” obscures racial progress, as one generation’s everyday slight is the next generation’s outrage. The “contradiction-closing” view of the legal world,
moreover, dismisses judicial defeats on the racial front as expected outcomes and rejects victories for racial equality as necessary concessions in
order to maintain the racial status quo. According to this mindset, then, the
judicial system sometimes seems incapable of issuing a decision that merits
praise for advancing black interests.

177

Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1060. This critique of legitimation was also voiced in the first sustained treatment of law
and race by a scholar associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement. See Alan David Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1978) (claiming that Supreme Court decisions that appear to benefit blacks in fact operate to validate a racially unjust legal structure); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The Survivors’ Story, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 21 (2004)
(contending that whites permit “short-term gains for African Americans when doing so furthers the
short- or long-term goals of the white elite. . . . This is an important check on widespread disaffection
that may end in revolution.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 717
(1992) (“The mere existence of Brown thus served to . . . legitimate current arrangements. True, many
blacks remained poor and disempowered. But their status was now no longer a result of the denial of
equality. Instead, it marked a personal failure to take advantage of one’s definitionally equal status.”).
179
Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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For example, Professor Bell dismisses the decision in Strauder v. West
Virginia,180 which invalidated a state statute prohibiting blacks from serving
on juries, as correcting such an obviously outrageous racial injustice that
the Court had no alternative other than to invalidate the statute.181 Viewing
Strauder as a prototypical contradiction-closing case that merely corrected a
“racial outrage,” Professor Bell wrote, “Even in the bleak period after Reconstruction came to an end, a quite conservative Supreme Court was willing to recognize the unfairness of convicting a black by a jury from which
members of his race were excluded by law.”182
Viewing Strauder as an inevitable victory for proponents of racial
equality, however, badly misses the mark. Strauder, lest we forget, was decided some sixteen years before Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court found
that separate-but-equal was not only constitutionally permissible but indicated that if black people took exception to Jim Crow’s indignities the problem was in their minds rather than in objective inequities.183 It is far from
clear what renders the exclusion of blacks from juries an outrage that must
be corrected but the exclusion of blacks from railcars a policy to be tolerated. One potential explanation for these seemingly incoherent decisions
would contend that, during the late nineteenth century, the prevailing legal
view regarded the Reconstruction Amendments as protecting “civil” and
“political” rights in a manner that did not extend to “social” rights.184 But
that tidy explanation is undermined by the post-Strauder decision of Giles
v. Harris,185 where the Supreme Court expressed impotence in its ability to
ensure that black people could exercise the franchise in the face of determined white opposition.186 Rather than constituting an inevitable victory
against a plainly racist statute, it is all too easy to envision the Supreme
Court validating West Virginia’s statute in Strauder.187
Quite apart from the underlying result in Strauder, moreover, the
Court’s reasoning in the case struck a blow against white supremacy by rejecting notions of black inferiority. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Strong wrote:
180

100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32.
182
Id.
183
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the
plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”).
184
See Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection
Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884, 886 (1987).
185
189 U.S. 475 (1903).
186
For an illuminating discussion of Giles, see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy,
and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000).
187
It seems worth noting here that two Justices dissented in Strauder. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 339 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting).
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The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because
of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure
to all others.188

The point here is not to suggest that, in the wake of Strauder, states no
longer found ways to exclude blacks from serving on juries. States certainly did continue to exclude blacks from juries for racial reasons in the late
nineteenth century, and they continue to do so today.189 The point, rather, is
that the Supreme Court in Strauder refused to place its imprimatur on the
notion that black people were, by virtue of their substandard intelligence
and morality, uniformly unfit to deliberate with white people. And that reasoning represented an important break with then-prevalent racial understandings. The Supreme Court’s racially egalitarian decision in Strauder
cannot be dismissed as a decision that sought to maintain white supremacy
in light of the blatant nature of West Virginia’s racially exclusionary statute.
In writing the Harvard Law Review’s Foreword to its annual Supreme
Court issue in 1985, Professor Bell utilized a similar method to minimize
the significance of Bob Jones University v. United States190 and Palmore v.
Sidoti,191 two prominent cases from the 1980s in which the Court issued decisions that were broadly understood to advance the cause of racial justice.
In Bob Jones, the Court validated an Internal Revenue Service rule that denied tax-exempt status to educational institutions that practiced racial discrimination.192 In Palmore, the Court reversed a lower court’s decision
withdrawing child custody from a white mother because she decided to
marry a black man.193 One might think that such significant and recent
Court decisions would receive more than passing reference in a Foreword
called The Civil Rights Chronicles. Rather than offering a sustained analysis of the opinions, however, Professor Bell merely cited them in a footnote
as instances of contradiction-closing cases.194
2. Avoidance of Racially Egalitarian Decisions.—Although Professor
Bell often criticizes Supreme Court decisions as racially unjust, he general188

Id. at 308 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race
Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1983).
190
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
191
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
192
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595–96.
193
See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434.
194
Bell, Foreword, supra note 170, at 32 n.94.
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ly refuses to acknowledge judicial decisions that evince racial progress.
This is the case even when transformations occur in the very areas of the
law that Professor Bell has suggested require judicial attention in light of
the interest-convergence thesis. Whatever the usual standard incumbent
upon law professors to address doctrinal shifts that conceivably undermine
the force of their analyses, the interest-convergence thesis is predicated on
racial stasis and the Court’s impervious approach to black interests. The interest-convergence thesis, then, imposes a special duty upon Professor Bell
to grapple with doctrinal shifts in areas that he has criticized under the interest-convergence theory and that have subsequently been altered. All too
often, however, the interest-convergence theory’s analysis is jettisoned
when confronted with judicial decisions that suggest racial progress.195
In the law-of-democracy field, for instance, Professor Bell allowed in
Racial Remediation that, while the Court might invalidate egregious instances of racial exclusion as it did in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,196 it would not
address more subtle instances of racial discrimination “that dilute seriously
[blacks’] political potential” because of the requirement for “prov[ing] that
the lines or policies were intended to have a racially discriminatory effect.”197 When Professor Bell first lodged this assessment in 1976, it was
difficult to quibble with its accuracy. In the intervening years, however,
approaches to minority political power have changed dramatically. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mobile v. Bolden, which required
that election schemes evince racially discriminatory “intent” in order to
trigger constitutional or statutory protection,198 Congress clarified in 1982
that plaintiffs could prevail upon a claim under section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act by examining “results” rather than intent.199 Subsequently, the
Court gave real shape to that more robust protection of minority voting
rights in Thornburgh v. Gingles, which established a manageable, three-part
test for proving vote dilution.200
Professor Bell has refrained from dedicating sustained attention to using the lens of interest-convergence to analyze how the Court, with prompting from the United States Senate, has substantially modified its approach
for vindicating a minority vote dilution claim. Instead, the 2004 edition of
Race, Racism, and American Law mentions Gomillion and the subsequent
equipopulous cases and then states: “[T]hese precedents have been far more
useful in correcting disparities in voting districts based on population than
195

Cf. Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1749 (contending that the scholarship of several prominent Critical Race Theorists, including Professor Bell, “reveal[s] significant deficiencies—the most general of
which is a tendency to evade or suppress complications that render their conclusions problematic”).
196
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
197
Bell, Racial Remediation, supra note 41, at 15–16.
198
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
199
See Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the
Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1983).
200
478 U.S. 30, 5051 (1986).
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in ending those created or maintained to dilute the potential voting strength
of blacks.”201 While Professor Bell does fleetingly acknowledge Gingles in
his casebook,202 he does not analyze the case in the context of interest convergence. Whether the new vote-dilution regime actually advances black
interests203 or whether the Court’s vote-dilution jurisprudence has been coopted by white suburbanites204 are conversations well worth having. But it
does not help to examine law and democracy with the interest-convergence
lens when the theory leads to favorable results and to abandon that lens
when arguably racially egalitarian judicial decisions muddy the analytical
waters.
Similarly, Professor Bell has offered criticism of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the use of peremptory strikes in jury trials. In Racial Remediation, Professor Bell criticized the Court’s holding in Swain v.
Alabama and its “refus[al] to condemn more sophisticated and no less effective means of barring blacks from juries, particularly in those cases
where racial issues are important.”205 Swain surely presented a worthy target for criticism. But Professor Bell has not explored how the interestconvergence theory is undermined by the Court’s repudiation of Swain in
Batson v. Kentucky, which introduced a burden-shifting mechanism for determining whether peremptory strikes were exercised in a nondiscriminatory fashion.206 That is not to suggest that Batson has proven to be a
completely effective remedy for rooting out racially-motivated peremptory
strikes; to the contrary, its flaws are legion.207 Indeed, I share the view of
Justices Thurgood Marshall208 and Stephen G. Breyer,209 among others, who
have suggested that abandoning peremptory strikes altogether may present
the only viable method of ensuring that the strikes are not exercised in a
discriminatory manner. Despite its considerable shortcomings, however,
one cannot doubt that Batson has provided at least some relief in instances
where prosecutors strike black jurors.210 And it is difficult to understand
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why a Court that, according to the interest-convergence theory, generally
evinces hostility to black interests would render such a decision.
Professor Bell need not go so far as to concede that the doctrinal developments in Gingles and Batson irreparably damage the theory. Many
commentators, as suggested above, have leveled criticisms of those decisions for providing insufficient relief to the problems that they purport to
address. Nonetheless, Professor Bell should explain how these decisions,
which would seem to reflect the Court’s commitment to racial equality, are
in fact merely further manifestations of the interest-convergence theory.
Conversely, if these cases do in fact cut against the interest-convergence
theory, Professor Bell should acknowledge that point frankly. Ignoring or
minimizing the significance of seemingly important doctrinal shifts regarding race enhances the concern that the interest-convergence theory is less
than fully committed to a candid assessment of developments in the legal
world.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THESIS
The interest-convergence theory’s analytical flaws lead to several undesirable consequences in the arena of race relations. The most obvious
consequence of contending that racial progress has been modest since the
days of slavery is that doing so invites black people to despair about the
possibility of achieving racial equality. Indeed, many scholars have criticized the fatalistic feature of Professor Bell’s work.211 In response, Professor Bell and some of his admirers have attempted to defang the fatalism
critique by contending that, even if black people cannot ultimately succeed
in altering their subordinate condition in American society, there remains a
certain nobility in the struggle.212 These efforts to deflect the critique of
despair, however, seem highly unpersuasive. If efforts to throw off the
yoke of racial oppression are truly futile, many black people can be expected to abandon efforts to win equality for the race, even if they do not
forsake individual advancement.213
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Rather than rehashing the despair critique, this Part will concentrate on
two underappreciated consequences that flow from the interest-convergence
thesis. First, the interest-convergence theory’s conception of the conditions
that are necessary to bring about change invites would-be racial reformers
to adopt artificially constrained notions of what constitutes a viable method
for seeking change. Second, the irrefutability of the interest-convergence
theory lends itself to a racially conspiratorial viewpoint that hinders black
advancement.
A. Constrained Racial Remedies
Proponents of the interest-convergence theory have long been concerned with its implications for advancing the cause of racial equality. Indeed, Professor Bell has suggested that the theory provides a
comprehensive map of the path leading to racial progress. “Further
progress to fulfill the mandate of Brown is possible to the extent that the divergence of racial interests can be avoided or minimized,” Professor Bell
has written.214 Erasing any doubt as to whether he regards interestconvergence as the sole method of achieving racial progress, Professor Bell
explained that “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”215
Many other scholars have also suggested that the interest-convergence
theory demonstrates how minorities—racial and otherwise—will be able to
win advancement.216 But the assertion that black people receive favorable
judicial decisions only when their interests converge with those of whites
invites proponents of racial equality to limit the menu of possible remedial
strategies for seeking black advancement. While appealing to interestconvergence impulses may present one powerful weapon for seeking racial
advancement, it should not be viewed as the entire arsenal.
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A leading consequence of subscribing to the interest-convergence
theory as the only (or even the predominant) method of achieving reform is
its inculcation of passivity in its adherents. This consequence is, of course,
a logical outgrowth of the lack of agency that the interest-convergence
theory accords black people. Waiting for moments of “racial fortuity” to
present themselves is, in many ways, not all that distinct an endeavor from
waiting for lightning to strikeor, perhaps more appositely still, waiting
for the stars to align. Indeed, it is no accident that at least one interestconvergence proponent has suggested precisely this astronomical metaphor
in seeking change in the animal rights context.217 Passivity, though, seldom
if ever lends itself to creating the conditions that are necessary to bring
about successful challenges to racial hierarchy.
Concentrating on interest convergence as the predominant method of
achieving racial equality often allocates insufficient space to other methods
of attempting to bring about racial change. By consistently attempting to
frame political and legal disputes in a manner that endeavors to explain why
white people stand to benefit from adopting a particular posture, advocates
of racial reform risk undervaluing the role that morality and honor play in
shaping political and legal debates. And the moral considerations of many
whites, contrary to Professor Bell’s view,218 have played an important role
in black advancement throughout American history.
Moreover, it can sometimes be very difficult, if not impossible, to explain why a particular decision will benefit white interests—at least in the
narrow sense of that term.219 The inability to frame an argument using the
language of white and black interest convergence should not discourage
black people from seeking governmental relief. This statement is particularly apt in the judicial realm, where the pull of interest convergence may be
minimal, at least in comparison to the political realm. Black people will
never know what governmental relief is possible if they limit the instances
in which they seek relief to instances where they can appeal to a narrowly
conceived notion of white self-interest.
The focus on interest convergence, to the virtual exclusion of other
strategies for racial advancement, motivates some legal commentators to
propose remedial ideas that are of dubious value. Two separate law review
articles, for instance, have contended that the United States’ war on terrorism presents the optimal conditions for racial minorities to advance interestconvergence arguments.220 Professor Eric Yamamoto, in making a case for
slavery reparations, has suggested that “the United States will lack unfet217
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tered moral authority and international standing to sustain a preemptive
worldwide war on terror unless it fully and fairly redresses the continuing
harms of its own historic government-sponsored terrorizing of a significant
segment of its populace.”221
If taken seriously, however, this scheme of attempting to capitalize
upon a national tragedy would run a serious risk of retarding the cause of
racial equality. If black people had begun pressing reparations claims with
increased intensity on September 12, 2001, those assertions may have underscored the belief that black people are not, in some fundamental sense,
truly Americans.222 Reinforcing the notion that blacks are, at most, quasiAmericans would certainly delay the day that blacks achieve genuine racial
equality. On a practical level, moreover, this adaptation of the interestconvergence theory would have little chance of actually succeeding. For
one thing, many blacks view themselves as intensely patriotic and would
have little stomach for attempting to divert attention away from capturing
the nation’s avowed enemies. For another, few government officials seem
likely to view the connection between Osama bin Laden’s brand of terrorism and Jim Crow’s brand of terrorism as sufficiently strong so as to require
political or judicial action.
One legal commentator has advanced a similarly flawed potential application of the interest-convergence theory in the context of achieving
school financing reform.223 Because black students disproportionately attend inner-city schools, Professor David Singleton has argued, the interestconvergence theory dictates that suburban school districts will not be convinced to share their economic wealth with urban school districts unless it
can be demonstrated that doing so would advance the interests of the suburban school districts.224 Among the other strategies for demonstrating how
interdistrict sharing would serve white interests, Professor Singleton contemplates emphasizing that underfunded inner-city schools produce poorly
educated black males who in turn commit crimes—sometimes against white
suburbanites.225 This strategy for racial and educational uplift amounts
221
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roughly to instructing white citizens: “Give black people your tax dollars or
else you will get robbed by a young, undereducated black man.” As even
Professor Singleton seems to recognize, however, heightening notions of
black criminality presents a reform strategy that may well contain considerable drawbacks.226
These efforts to shoehorn remedial policies regarding black reparations
and school financing into the interest-convergence paradigm illustrate how
the theory occupies an inordinately large place in the imagination of racial
reformers. Not every cause lends itself to being framed in a manner that
appeals to the interest-convergence impulse. Indeed, framing arguments in
terms of interest convergence sometimes risks stalling progress toward racial equality, as the constant search for moments of interest convergence
can cause advocates to overlook more promising avenues of achieving racial reform. Worse, the fixation on interest convergence could affirmatively
retard racial progress by portraying blacks as quasi-Americans or accentuating the criminality of black males. None of this is to contend, of course,
that proponents of racial equality should altogether abandon the interestconvergence strategy. Highlighting the ways in which society as a whole
stands to benefit from black advancement can sometimes form the basis of
a powerful argument in the judicial or the political realm.227 Focusing on
the interest-convergence theory to the exclusion of all other strategies, however, unnecessarily closes off many promising avenues for racial reform.
B. Racial Conspiracy Theory
The inability to refute the suggestion that the interest-convergence
theory is at work results in the reinforcement of racially conspiratorial
thought, a mindset that is disturbingly prominent within the black community.228 Although conspiracy theories often flourish among the most marlink between black males’ low graduation rates and increasing crime rates persuade white suburbanites
to tolerate, if not embrace, interdistrict economic integration?”).
226
Id. at 675 (“Emphasizing this link . . . reinforces the stereotype of young black men as dangerous
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ginalized and disaffected members of society,229 large segments of even the
most upwardly mobile black citizens appear to subscribe to racially conspiratorial ideas. One study that polled the attitudes toward racial conspiracy
among college students found that 60.2% of black respondents thought that
it was definitely true or possibly true that the AIDS virus was intentionally
designed in a laboratory to infect blacks.230 Even more staggeringly, fully
84.1% of the black college students deemed it definitely true or possibly
true that the United States government intentionally ensures that illicit
drugs are available in impoverished black communities.231 The belief that
American society has systematically oppressed black people is, of course,
far from a figment of the black imagination, as this nation’s sordid racial
past teems with examples of precisely such treatment.232 Nevertheless, in
the modern era, no evidence confirms that large-scale racial conspiracies
exist within the United States.
The relentless search to identify widespread racial conspiracies exacts
serious costs on many black citizens. Not the least of these costs is that
when one constantly searches for racial conspiracies, they can often be
found—even when they do not exist. While it is certainly true that just because you are paranoid does not mean that they are not out to get you,233
many individuals would do well to remember that the converse applies with
at least equal force: espousing racially paranoid rhetoric does not mean that
you have in fact uncovered a conspiracy to oppress black people. As political science Professor Edward Banfield wrote four decades ago, “It is bad
enough to suffer real prejudice . . . without having to suffer imaginary pre-
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judice as well.”234 A related cost of the racially conspiratorial viewpoint is
that the search prevents at least some black people from seeking interracial
understanding and relationships, as white people are warily viewed as potential conspirators in racial oppression.235 A final cost of ubiquitously perceived (and asserted) racial conspiracies stems from the risk that such
claims become part of the nation’s permanent background noise, preventing
advocates for racial equality from gaining sorely needed attention to address
policies and laws that have a disproportionately negative impact on black
lives.236
Notably, the interest-convergence thesis accounts for the existence of
“racial paranoia,” but it acknowledges the phenomenon as existing only
among white people.237 Professor Bell, as early as 1979, contended that the
idea underlying the interest-convergence theory means that white opponents
of policies or decisions that would seem to benefit blacks evince a brand of
racial paranoia.238 If blacks receive seemingly favorable decisions only
when white interests are advanced (or at least not harmed), the theory runs,
then clear-thinking white people should understand that they always gain
more from what are ostensibly black victories. As Professor Bell has written, “One would imagine that only a perverse form of racial paranoia can
explain white opposition to racial remedies that, history teaches us, benefit
whites more than blacks.”239
In his recent elaboration upon this “perverse form of racial paranoia,”240 Professor Bell addresses white opposition to affirmative action in a
way that is designed to critique racially conspiratorial thinking but in fact
succeeds principally in exposing his own racially conspiratorial thought.241
Professor Bell suggests that whites should actually support affirmative ac234
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tion policies because doing so would advance their economic interests.242
“White women have been the major beneficiaries of affirmative action,”
Professor Bell contends.243 “And to the extent that affirmative action rules
often require advertising jobs rather than simply filling them via existing
‘old-boy’ networks, white men have had access to positions they would
have never learned of without the policies so many of them abhor.”244
This analysis is confounding. White men are, of course, the prototypical beneficiaries of the old-boy network, in which occupational positions
are filled through back channels rather than formal applications. Thus, it is
difficult to understand how white men would benefit from a system that decreases the importance of social capital.245 It is quite possible, of course,
that the advertising requirement would result in no meaningful change
whatsoever. Merely learning about the existence of a position is no guarantee of landing a position, as advertising the job may in fact constitute a mere
formality, with the actual hiring decision occurring in much the way of the
old-boy network.246 This strained effort to identify appreciable benefits for
white men as a result of affirmative action, rather than to be content identifying even static racial conditions, reveals the conspiratorial nature of the
interest-convergence ideology.
Like many conspiracy theories, a key feature of the interestconvergence theory views the search for racial conspiracies as being essential precisely because they are difficult to detect.247 Perhaps the clearest
manifestation of the belief that conspiracies are often subtle comes in the
epigraph to Professor Bell’s 2004 book, Silent Covenants:
The world is moved by diverse powers and pressures creating cross currents
that unpredictably, yet with eerie precision, determine the outcome of events.
Often invisible in their influence, these forces shape our destinies, furthering
or frustrating our ambitions and goals. The perfection for which we strive is
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elusive precisely because we are caught up in the myriad of manifestations of
perfection itself.248

In a tribute to Professor Bell’s work, Professor Richard Delgado has also
emphasized the subterranean aspect of racism: “American society oppresses
and subordinates minorities of color at every turn, subscribing to a nearly
invisible ideology that finds [racial] oppression tolerable, natural, and inevitable.”249
The interest-convergence theory’s conspiratorial view envelops itself
in the notion that only the theory’s adherents have the courage to see and
acknowledge how racial considerations actually operate in the real world.250
Professor Bell has written that the outlook “is simply a hard-eyed view of
racism as it is and [blacks’] subordinate role in [society].”251 Individuals
who disagree with the interest-convergence theory’s conclusions are dismissed as being uninformed and naïve. For example, Professor Bell has recently explained that commentators who believe that “Brown was and is a
valuable precedent” are “entitled to their viewsbut they fit quite nicely
with those who hold that the earth is, after all, flat.”252
The conspiratorial viewpoint is so thoroughly incorporated into the interest-convergence theory that it even serves to explain why people express
skepticism of the theory’s explanatory power. The completely selfreinforcing nature of the interest-convergence thesis is captured by Professor Delgado’s fictional protagonist, Rodrigo Crenshaw. “As you’ll see,”
Professor Crenshaw explains, “interest-convergence explains resistance to
the very idea of interest-convergence.”253 This sentence encapsulates how
the interest-convergence theory offers a truly unified theory of law and race.
Indeed, some interest-convergence adherents even go so far as to detect
conspiracies in the reception to Professor Bell’s scholarship.254
The conspiratorial manner in which the interest-convergence theory is
propounded, thus, has the undesirable appearance of seeking to silence dissenting viewpoints. The theory’s derision of potential objections either as
evincing naïveté or further confirming the unified theory of race relations
248
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does not exactly lend itself to probing scholarly exchange. Nevertheless,
rejecting the interest-convergence theory’s efforts to stifle intellectual exchange is nothing less than imperative.
CONCLUSION
The article that coined the term “interest convergence” ended with the
suggestion that “awareness” is “always the first step toward overcoming
still another barrier in the struggle for racial equality.”255 Although the preceding pages have offered many theoretical criticisms of the interestconvergence thesis, this Article heartily endorses that conclusion. Indeed,
this Article has been animated by the proposition that advocates of racial
equality, who demonstrate intimate familiarity with the theory’s virtues,
would benefit from an increased awareness of the theory’s vulnerabilities.
Beyond the racial context, moreover, my broader hope is that legal
scholars and other individuals who have incorporated the insights of interest
convergence wholesale into various legal and political arenas will critically
examine both the theory and its applications. The interest-convergence
theory can offer valuable and formidable insights into the way that change
occurs; it should not, however, be viewed as either flawless or allencompassing.256 Instead of adhering to any unified theory, reformers seeking change would do better to think of the interest-convergence thesis as but
one weapon in the fight for progress rather than as the entire arsenal. Advocates for change, moreover, should be particularly circumspect of attempting to implement the interest-convergence strategy when doing so
may further the very inequalities that they seek to erase. Initiating this conversation about the frailties of interest convergence, then, may well help to
advance the nation’s continuing struggle for equalitynot only regarding
race but along the many stubborn dimensions of inequality.
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